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Draft Recommendation
on IYEU's contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa
The Assembly,
(i) Horrified by the many violent conflicts, accompanied by humanrtanan disaster and numerous
serious violations of human rights whrch have ravaged many African states in recent years;
(u) Supportrng the view that the perpetrators ofthe 1994 genocide and other serious violations of
humanitanan international law in Rwanda should be prosecuted and sentenced m due form by the
International Tnbunal on crimes against humanities in Rwanda;
(ru) Concerned that politrcal instability in a number of African countries appears to be an almost
permanent feature and is often the result of the autocratrc behaviour of regimes refusing to share any
power with important sections of society and obstructrng badly-needed economic reform;
(w) Au'are that foreign mrlitary intervention in the intemal affairs of a soverergn state with an
existing legrtrmate governrnent wrthout the consent of that government in prrncrple constitutes an
infringement of international law;
(r) Taking the view nonetheless that there rs a moral obligation to try to define a right of
intervention in the event of a serious violatron of human rights, genocide or expulsion, or the
annihilation of minoritres ;
(w) Convinced, however, that the Unrted Nations, regronal or sub-regional organisations or even
indrvidual states can play an rmportant role as mediators and peace brokers in rnternal conflicts;
(vr) Aware that as a consequence of recent experienccs, both the United States and Europe have
become more reluctant to participate in multinational forces in Africa for humanitarian, peacekeeping or
peace-enforcing operations ;
(viti) Notrng that the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability' in Africa is not helped by
debates and differences over spheres of mfluence between the United States and Europe:
(ix) Considering, however, that there are regions in Africa where Europe, as a consequence of its
long-standing close relations and its profound knouledge of the situation, may have to take the lead in
peace mrtratrves and related multinational military operations with humanitarian or peacekeepmg
oblectives,
(x) Regretting that the competent European bodies have not taken any decisive actron to protect and
provide assistance to Rwandan refugees, and in partrcular refuting the argument that protectmg refugees
u,ould have been tantamount to protectmg Mobutu and obstructing Kabila's advance, now that
increasing evidence of refugee massacres by Kabila's rebel forces rs comrng to the fore,
(n) Emphasisrng that rn the light of the disastrous consequences of non-action, both the European
Uruon and WEU wrll have to be better prepared to take raprd initiatives and action in Africa in the
future;
(xir) Stressing that here again the availabilitv of timely, reliable and comprehensive intelligence is
vrtal for effective initiatives in the field of conflict prevention and management;
(nti) Aknowledgrng that for a number of reasons, not least that of precluding any suspicion of neo-
colonialism, the preventron and management of crises and conflicts in Africa should preferably be left to
African regional or sub-regional organrsations;
(nv) Aware, however, that African regional and sub-regional cooperation in the prevention and
management of crises and conflicts is onl.v in its infancy, despite a number of earher initiatives;
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(xv) Considering that in view of what would appear to be increasing western reluctance to particrpate
in multinational military operations in Africa, efforts to help establish a multinational African raprd
action force for humanitanan and peacekeeping operations should be intensified;
(xui) Welcomrng the constructive efforts of the South African Presrdent, Nelson Mandela, to find a
peaceful solution to the conflict in the Great Lakes region,
(wu) Welcoming WEU's initiatives to establish relations with the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) rn the context of African peacekeeping operations;
(xwi) Convinced that all efforts in the field of conflict prevention and management wrll have only a
limited effect unless African governments make a serious effort to bring about economic reforms and
socio-economic development in their countries,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.NCIL
L Continue its efforts to establish a closer relationship between the Organisation of African Unity
and WEU, in particular with a view to helping improve the OAU's conflict-prevention and management
capabilities, rncluding the creation of African military multrnational humamtarian and peacekeeping
forces;
2. Instruct the Planning Cell and its Intelligence Section to continuously monitor and assess
developments in those regions in Africa where Europe, through its special relationship and interests, is
likely to get involved rn conflict prevention and management;
3. Strengthen relations with the EU in order to be able to react rapidly and in a coordinated marurer
to cnses on the Afrrcan continent where Europe has a role to play.
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Explanatory Memorandu m
(submitted by Mr Masseret, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The Great Lakes regron is in turmoil and
in spite of countless diplomatic initiatives, con-
ferences and sumrrtits, nobody seems to have the
recrpe for establishing peace and security in the
reglon.
2. ln Zaire, President Mobutu's r6gime has
crumbled and there rs uncertainty over what dir-
ection the new leader will follow Negotiations
between the government of Zaire and the rebels
have started but there is no guarantee that an
agreement will satisfr all the existing political
factions in the country and create a stable situa-
tion.
3. In Burundi, three years of insurgency have
claimed over 150 000 lives with ethnic stnfe and
killings still rampant.
4. Rwanda is lickrng rts wounds after having
lived through one of the most repulsive genocides
in recent history. The srtuation has not stabilised
yet and ethnic killings continue to be reported.
5. Uganda, which has enjoyed unprecedented
economic and politrcal stability since President
Museveni came to power in 1986, is now con-
tending wrth a rebel movement that has terrorised
its northern region for three years.
6. Unrest in Africa is by no means limited to
the Great Lakes region and one need only think
of countries such as Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan and
Somalia to realise that more violence and human-
itarian crises are in the making
7. Does Europe have vrtal mterests in Africa
and is it responsible for peace, secunty and stab-
ility on that continent? If so, to what extent?
Should its role be confined solely to humanitarian
relief operations and operations to rescue Euro-
pean citizens in danger? Should operations of
any kind be implemented exclusively by former
colonial powers or should all European states
share this responsrbility? Can Europe act on its
own or should it cooperate with other states or
regional orgamsatrons and what is the role of the
United Nations?
8. There are no easy answers to these and
many other questions related to Europe's role in
Africa. The present report, which focuses on the
srtuation in the four countries most involved in
the present crisis in the Great Lakes region, does
not claim to provide all the answers It can only
make a contribution to the ongoing discussron in
which WEU has already taken some initratrves.
II. A short post-colonial history ofZaire,
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda
9. The Great Lakes region of Afrrca, as it is
known, has been a focus of international interest
since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The re-
gion basically comprises four countnes wrth
many similarities. At the end of the lfth cen-
tury, King Leopold II of Belgrum built an empire
larger than Europe covering Rwanda, Zaire and
Burundi. Belgium's presence was less signrfi-
cant in Burundi and Rwanda than in Zaire for
although the first two countries had a degree of
strategic and demographrc interest (as bases for
evacuation or a reserye pool of labour) they had
very little economic influence. Alongside the
three countries under Belgian domination,
Uganda, during the colonial period, was under
British rule. All four gained independence at the
start of the 1960s and all of them are today ex-
periencing difficulty achieving stabrlity A study
of their history can therefore help us to under-
stand better the struggles now tearing the regron
apart and how western nations might be involved.
(a) Zaire
The period of Belgian coloruahsatron and pro-
gress towards independence
10. In 1877 Morton Stanley, after a gruelling
expedition, succeeded in crossing the equatorial
forest. Aware of the enorrnous economic poten-
tial of this part of Africa, he proposed to his own
country, Britain, that rt should develop it. How-
ever, the Belgian King with his fascination for
Africa and its explorers, was the one to take an
interest in Stanley's discovery and seek to exploit
it
I l. Initially the Belgian conquest of the area
was strictly a personal venture 
- 
Leopold II
annexed the Congo as his own pnvate domain
through the Associafion Internafionale du
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Congo which was created in 1879 and, mainlv
through the exploitation of rubber. opened the
country up to trade. At the Berhn conference rn
1885, Leopold II succeeded rn havrng the AIC's
sovereignty recognised. The Congolese State
began to develop its oun administratrve and
commercial infrastructure. Protestant and Cath-
olc mrssions flourished, bringing progress in
education and health care
12. However, a vast public outcry was quick
to denounce the abuses of the s)'stem set up by
Leopold II, among them land confiscatron and the
use of forced labour, wrth the result that on 20
August 1908 the Congo was annexed b1' the
Brussels parliament and became the Belgran
Congo where a more traditional form of colonial-
ism prevarled untrl 1960. For half a century the
Belgian Congo experienced massive economic
growth, made possible by the ultra-patemalistic
policres devised by mainland Belgrum. based on
an effective threefold combination of Iarge com-
panies, (indirect) administration and religious
missrons (there rvere over 7 000 European mis-
sionaries in the Congo on the eve of independ-
ence).
13. Independence was achreved through the
efforts of a relatively small elite, which although
petty bourgeois in material outlook 
- 
being made
up of accountants, schoolmasters, offrce workers
and the like 
- 
nevertheless formed an intellectual
aristocracy. The first royal vrsrt to the colonl, by
King Baudouin in 1955 initialh' received high
acclaim from the local populace but the euphorra
quickly evaporated in the face of the avowed
hostilrtv of the colonialists to the 30-year plan
draun up by the Belgran professor, Van Bilsen.
The objective of this was the progresslve eman-
cipation of the Congo until it achieved independ-
ence by increasing the ranks of white collar and
elite groups and the steady expansron of their
role within a federal nation, m close liaison wrth
metropolitan Belgium. The plan awoke a latent
natronal consciousness among the African popu-
lation.
14. The old Bakongo Association (Abako) led
by Joseph Kasavubu, u'as the first to demand
political rrghts and basic freedoms for Africans
and to reject the Van Bilsen plan. The Abako
was an orgamsation of tribal origin and rvas to
acquire nationwide rnfluence, thanks to its pres-
ence in the prosperous region around the caprtal
The other major nalonal movement to emerge in
1958 was the National Congolese Movement, led
by Patnce Lumumba. A number of other partres
werc formed rvith ethnic or regronal bases, in
particular the Confederation of Katangese Asso-
crations (Canakat), led by'Morse Tshombe. 1958
\\'as a turning pornt for emancipation, both on
account of the world exhibition in Brussels,
which gave members of the Congolese elite the
opportunity of discoverrng the whrte rvorld, and
General de Gaulle's address nBrazzavrlle on24
August whrch made reference to independence
for the French colonres. Lastly, the pan-African
conference was held in Accra in December, from
rvhich Lumumba retumed, fired by the national-
ist speeches he had heard there, to advocate rnde-
pendence as a fundamental right of the Congolese
people.
15. Followrng an anti-European riot whrch
took place in Ldopoldville early in 1959, leaving
42 dead, King Baudouin announced on 13 Janu-
ary that Belgium u'as ready to grant the Congo
mdependence. 1959 u'as horvever marked by a
number of disturbances, although it was possible
for a round table to be organised in Brussels,
from 20 January to 20 February 1960, bnnging
together the leaders of the tu'o major parties and
a number of tribal chiefs The round table
agreed on 30 June 1960 as the country's inde-
pendence da1'and lard dorm the broad outlines
for the future organisation of the country The
basic law.of 19 May 1960 reflected these ideas
and established a strong central authority coupled
wrth a bicameral parhament. The MNC emerged
the victor in the parliamentary elections held in
May' but had nonetheless to do a deal vvith
Abako Joseph Kasavubu became Head of State
and Patrice Lumumba Prime Minister
From mdependence to Mobutu's accesston to
power 
- 
a penod of turmorl (1960-65)
16 ln Zaire, the ending of colonial rule coin-
cided, over a period of several years, with the
collapse of the state. Civrl war and anarchy took
hold of a country which, m many people's vrew
had been one of the best administered colonics rn
Africa. Lumumba, the sole supporter of Congo-
lese unit1,, was not sufficiently powerful within
the Assembly to rmpose hrs own vision.
17 On I I Jull' 1960, Katanga declared rnde-
pendence under the leadershrp of Moise
Tshombe, supported by Belgrum. The loss of the
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region was not only a pubhc threat and a danger-
ous precedent as far as Leopoldville was con-
cerned, but worse still an economic catastrophe.
Lumumba therefore appealed to the Unrted
Nailons in mid-July The IIN then launched
UNOC, the United Nations Operation Congo, a
force of 20 000 men with a mandate to re-estab-
lish order and hold the country together. In
Katanga, Belgran forces were gradually replaced
by blue berets.
l8 However civil war in Zaire was to last
until 1965. On 5 September 1959, Lumumba
and Kasalubu, the latter cntical of the Prime
Minister because of the methods employed by the
national Congolese army in reconquering south
Kasai, mutually divested one another of office.
Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief-of-Staff, then
seized po\\'er for three months. On 17 January
1963, Lumumba was assassinated under circum-
stances that remain unclear to this day, turning
him rnto a national hero. Thus, after only six
months of independence, Zaire fell prey to total
chaos. The country was divided between three
different leaderships: the central government in
Ldopoldvrlle, supported by the UN and the West,
the pro-Lumumba government m Gizenga which
controlled Stanleyville and the eastern regions
backed by the Soviet Union, and the govemment
of Katanga, which was recognised officially by
no-one but kept under close scrutiny by all in
view of its economlc importance
19. Despite attempts to achreve a settlement
(the L6opoldville round in Januarl, 1961, the
Tananarive round in March and the Coquihatvrlle
round in Aprrl-May), breakdown was total
President Kasalubu finally accepted that the UN
should take the country in hand under the iron
grip of Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold.
ln July 1961, a govenxnent vested wrth legiti-
mate authority led by Cyrille Adoula took office.
Adoula was in power from August 1961 to June
1964. But there was continued resistance from
the secessionist provmce of Katanga. Hammar-
sk16ld died in a plane crash as he left to negotiate
a ceasefire with Tshombe. The new Secretary-
General, U Thant, supported by the United
States, therefore decrded to bring Katanga back
into the Congolese Republic by force. The blue
berets finally put an end to the Katangese seces-
sion on 14 Januarl, 1963.
20. Cyrille Adoula's Govemment also had to
deal with the economic crisrs that had the countrv
in its grip. Just as the UN was taking the deci-
sion to wrthdraw its troops (because of severe
financial difficulties) Cyrille Adoula, before
resigning, speeded up the redrafting of the Con-
stitution which was adopted by referendum.
Working hand in glove with General Mobutu, the
Chief-of-Staff of the Congolese National Army,
he contacted Moise Tshombe and invited him
back from Spain. The latter was more or less
imposed on President Kasavubu and took power
in August 1964. The very first task he had to
contend ll'ith was to pacifu the country and there
were high hopes for the effectrveness of the
ANC, which intervened in Stanleyville in Nov-
ember, supported by Belgian parachute
commandos (Operation Red Dragon), to release
hundreds of Europeans who had been taken
hostage by the rebels. At the end of January
1965, the ANC controlled the entire Congolese
territory.
The Mobutu rdgtme
2l On 25 November 1965, Mobutu Sese
Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga (literally, the
man who soars from victory to victory and leaves
nothing behind him, or, alternatively, the farm-
yard cock that covers all the hens) overturned
Kasar,ubu and seized power in Zaire. Mobutu
suspended the Constrtution and dismissed the
Assembly, thus gradually eliminating the old
political class. Resolved to create a unitary state,
in 1966 he founded the Revolutionary Volunteer
Corps, which later became the Popular Revolu-
tionary Movement and subsequently the sole
political party. On 24 March 1967, he
proclaimed the second Republic based on a
presidentral-type constitution approved by
referendum. In November 1970, Mobutu was
elected Presrdent of the Republic with almost
100% ofthe vote.
22 In 1971, Mobutu, who was consolidating
his position as dictator, announced the birth of
Zaire to replace the Congo. A process of
"Zainnisation" was agreed at the end of 1973
whrch was supposed to precipitate the emergence
of a true African culture, driving out any element
that might in any way be construed as harking
back to colonialism (hence the form of address
Crtoyen or Crtoyenne instead of Monsieur or
Madame). Along with the Abacost a shortened
form of the slogan a bas le costume, a call to
outlaw European masculine dress (surt and tie),
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Mobutu decrded to confiscate the means of pro-
duction which was still in European hands and to
reallocate it through the MPR. The arm of this
exercise was to consolidate his power but this
"renaissance" qurckly turned out to be a financial
drsaster and Mobutu's reign was thus marked by
a severe rise in poverty among town-dwellers and
in the countryside. From 1976 onwards, the
dictator did a partial U-turn on his policy passing
retrocession measures which restored their rights
and property to former coloruahsts. However as
the latter had lost confidence m the country, the
move was largely a failure.
23. In May 1978 more than 4 000 Katangese
rebels disembarked at Kolwezi. They had
belonged to a force created by Moise Tshombe
during the Katangese secession in 1960 and had
then taken refuge in Angola where they helped
the Portuguese colonial settlers in their fight
agarnst the Angolan rebels. When the colonial-
ists left, they threw their lot in with the MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola) and fought for victory for Angostinho
Neto. In 1968 they changed their name to the
FNLC, Congolese National Liberation Front.
When they launched a lightning offensrve on
Zaire in 1978, the Zairian armed forces were
taken by surprise and almost immedrately
overwhelmed. Presrdent Mobutu then appealed
for help from all the countries of the
Organrsatron for African Unity as a result of
which Morocco decided to intervene, supported
by the French airforce. Airforce Transalls
established a bridgehead between the Maghreb
and Zaire and parachutists of the second REP
legion were dropped on Kolwesr. Thanks to
these reinforcements, the Zairian armed forces
counterattacked and the crisis was brought under
control by the end of May. The European
soldiers belongrng to the mterventron force were
sent home on 2l May and replaced by an rnter-
Afncan force (drawn from Morocco, Gabon,
Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo).
24 Mobutu therefore ruled since 1965 over
the largest country (2.3 million km2) rn black
Africa and one of very considerable economic
potential hydro-electnc power, natural geo-
logical wealth (copper, diamonds, cobalt, gold
and uranium) and so on. President Mobutu, on
account of hrs co'untry's over-abundance in so
many areas, was invariably to lay clarm to lead-
ership wrthin the regron.
25 In geopolitical terms, the enormous srze of
the country undoubtedly militates against unitv,
so that it might truly be said that there are not
one but several Zaires, entirely separate from one
another on account of a lack of genenc ties or
communicatron routes. There are srgnificant
irregularities both in terms of wealth and politrcal
organisation between the country's vanous
provinces. An example in point is the vast Shaba
mrning region, in the south-east corner of Zaire,
whrch, as mentioned earher, seceded in 1960
leadrng to LIN mterventron in 1963. The
"separateness" ofthe Shaba is accentuated by its
distance from the capital and serves to demon-
strate how diffrcult it is to achieve unity over
such a vast area. The hold of the central gov-
ernment over upper Zaire is also extremely tenu-
ous to sa1-the least, largely because of an almost
total absence of road or rail links.
26 Moreover, under the dnving force of
Monsignor Malula, the Church very quickly be-
came an alternatrve power and rallying point
among the people when Mobutu was in power.
To counteract its influence, the dictator encour-
aged the development of numerous sects The
presence of sects in Zaire is moreover a phe-
nomenon of long standrng There has always
been strong resistance among the Congolese
peoples to colonial influence 
- 
an attitude often
fostered b1' messianic religious sects that advo-
cate a Congo for the Congolese and the mamten-
ance of ancestral traditrons. Thus, for example,
Simon Kimbangu, who in the 1920s clarmed to
have been touched by the Lord, preached human
rights and supported the idea of natronalism as
the means of black peoples' salvation from
colonialism.
The 1990s and the opening up of the pohtical
system
27 . On 26 April 1990 the one-party state gave
way to a third repubhc. However on the night of
ll-12 Mav of that year, massacres of students
took place on the Lubumbashi campus leavrng 50
or so dead, according to Amnesty International,
and causing outrage in the international com-
munity Belgrum severed its ties with Zaire. The
European Union suspended aid to the country
and the IMF refused to grant it further credit
28. In l99l there was seemrngly a return to
democracy and a national conference began in
the summer. However notrng and looting took
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place on 23 and 24 September 1991 leaving l17
dead and leading, on 25 September, to a military
mtervention by France and Belgium and the exo-
dus of the majority of foreigners strll living rn
Zaire. Tlte French operation involved men drawn
from its rapid action force while Belgium
deployed 500 parachutists (Operation Blue
Beam). On I October, Mobutu's 'opponent,
Etienne Tshiskedi, leader of the Union for
Progress and Social Democracy (UPDS), was
appointed Prime Mrnister but was told on 2l
October that hrs services were no longer required
and replaced by Munguel Diaka, followed by
Karl I Bond on 25 November. The capital and
the major towns suffered looting at the hands of
both civilians and the mrhtary rn disturbances
that could be described as "bread riots" or
spontaneous uprisings of a population ground
down by poverfy 
- 
the logical conclusion of the
deterioration in the pol-itical, economic and
social climate. In October l99l a second wave
of looting was unleashed over the country' from
which the Equator region, where Mobutu came
from, alone was spared.
29. The national conference resumed m Janu-
ary 1992. Suspended for a penod at the end of
January, following an attempted coup, it resumed
and proclaimed its sovereignty on 15 April. On
the 2lst of that month it elected Monsignor Lau-
rent Monsengwo President and Etienne Tshise-
kedi Prime Minister on 14 August, with 70%o of
the vote cast The latter then decided to try and
bring the country's currency under control 
- 
an
rssue of national concern Mobutu had been used
to printing the money he needed abroad and poor
management of the currency was leading to gal-
loping rnflation. 5 December 1992 saw the for-
mation of the High Council of the Repubhc,
made up of 453 members, to replace Parhament
and control both Government and President.
However Mobutu, unwilling to rergn if not
permitted to rule, refused to recognise Prime
Minister Tshisekidi's legitimacy. The HCR re-
taliated by threatening to dismiss Mobutu. The
people were prepared to fight to defend the
powers won by, the conference. Mobutu then
unleashed the army against the civilian
population leading to riots, during the course of
whrch the French Ambassador, Philippe Bemard
rvas killed on24 January 1993.
30. On 5 February 1993 Mobutu sacked
Tslusekedi and on 17 March appointed Faustin
Birindua who was repudiated by the HCR.
Hence there were two governments, as the dicta-
tor appointed a new govemment, while Tshrse-
kedi's ministers, supported by the national con-
ference went underground. The total impover-
rshment of the people reached its height wrth the
new Brrindua Government and the launch of a
new currency, the "new Zaire". Monsignor
Monsengwo, a chansmatic figure within the
National Conference, then brought in a thrrd
man, Kengo u'a Dondo, between Tshisekedi (who
was unable to govern) and Birindua (recognised
only by Mobutu). A new institution emerged
from the compromise Monsignor Monsengwo
tried to reach between Mobutu and his
opponents. Thrs was the HCR-PT (High Council
of the Republic 
- 
Parliament of Transition) and
included both members of the HCR and the
conclave loyal to the President.
31. Calm appeared to return, when on 14 July
1994, Kengo wa Dondo was appointed Prime
Minister 
- 
to the great relief of western govern-
ments, especially Pans. However he farled to
rvin the support of the local population. The new
head of government promised to privatise the
economy and restrain President Mobutu's finan-
cial appetites. He also reassured international
financial organisations by making regular repay-
ments of Zaire's debts.
32. To have an understanding of the way the
Mobutu regime worked it should be made clear
that the latter invariably held power through a
policl' of ethnic divide and rule, without flinching
from bloodlettrng when the opportunity de-
manded it in order to make himself indispensable
as an arbitrator. One of his favourite catch
phrases was "erther me or chaos". More than
200 trrbal groups live side by' side in Zare,
hence, when the local peoples in Katanga prov-
ince which came to be known as the Shaba re-
fused to work the mines, there was an influx of
settlers from other regions. Thus the Baluba
(from Kasai) arrived en masse and won the 1958
local elections. In 1960 Moise Tshombe de-
clared that Katanga province had seceded and
instigated an initial purge of the Baluba. In 1990
secessionist ideas resurfaced in the Shaba.
Mobutu then played upon the discontent of the
indrgenous Katangese, identifuing the Baluba as
those primarrly responsrble for Katangese
mrsfortunes.
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33. Thus when Karl I Bond was appornted
Prime Minister in 1991. he formed an alhance
with the new governor of the Shaba, Kyungu rva
Kumanza, which led to the Baluba becomrng the
target of ethnic cleansmg. The excuse for their
expulsion was the notonous "myth of ongin",
The role of the "Juferi" the youth wing of the
UFEzu (Union of Independent Federalists and
Republicans) was crucial in dnving out the
Kasai, commonly known as the "Jews of Zaire".
Juferi militra harassed the Kasai untrl November
1992, causmg some 50 to 100 000 deaths. The
international press unu'ittingly underestimated
the event to the extent that it had no access to
Copper Valley. The initral reaction of the Cath-
olic hierarchy came to light only in March 1993.
The expulsion of the Kasai led to the economic
destruction of the Shaba which was very quickly
laid at the door of Kinshasa.
34. In Kiw the political intrigue of Krnshasa
seemed very remote and Mobutu, on his return,
took very little notice of the province. Horvever
Kilu representatives were among the most loyal
delegates to the Natronal Conference. Thel' came
out m support of Tshisekedi and set up Monsi-
gnor Monsengwo as leader. A real grass roots
democracv had been established in the province
and Klr.u rvas at the time described by,the Presi-
dent's securitv services as the stronghold of the
radical opposition Krnshasa then attempted to
crush the region using the same ethnic manipula-
tion strategy as m the Shaba.
Assessment of a rergn
35. Present-day Zaire is one of the poorest
countries in the world. Its position became still
worse in the early nineties, largely'because of the
collapse of copper production Thus Gccamrnes,
(the nationalised companv that u'as the successor
to the Upper Katanga Mining Unron) rvhrch rvas
normally the main source of state income, was no
longer able to fund the budget. The most ex-
treme variants of the parallel economy therefore
became essential to people's survival. Under
such crrcumstances, any attempt to produce sta-
tistics on lhe Zainan economy is a mere guessing
game grven the extent of the distortion between
the official view of Zaire arrd the economic
realities of dailv hfe. A World Bank study in
May l99l showed that between 25 and 50o/o of
transport capacit_v rvas undeclared. Nor can gold
production stailstics be taken to be rehable since
border proximity served to facilitatc invisible
trade and smugghng m dramonds and coffee as
u,ell as gold was rife in border areas. Moreover
bartenng was widespread m the face of the col-
lapse of the Zairia:i. currency rvhich was virtually'
valueless
36. Currency also flou'ed along the same clan-
destrne routes as black market goods It was said
that Mobutu's fortunc cqualled Zaire's debt,
makrng the old leader one of the richest men in
the rvorld. In the vreu'of many analysts, Zaire's
sickness u'as basically comrption. Those with
even a modicum of porver used it to obtain
money or matenal advantage.
37. From an international point of vrew, Bel-
grum's influence had continued to dechne under
the combined effect of action bv France and the
United States. The latter supported Mobutu and
the Amerrcans used the Kamina arr base during
the Angolan conflict in therr struggle against the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba.
Mobutu's involvement in this conflrct perhaps
serves to explarn hrs political survrval. However
although he succeeded in retarning power rvrth
Amencan ard and the support of the army, and
by using the Zaman armed forces to guarantee
national unit\,, he seems in view of the new inter-
nafional situation to be in a far less strong posi-
tron today'
38. 1996 was marked by a total destabilisation
of thc regrme. Mobutu, now old and sick, was
unable to crush the advance of the rebels who
challenged his authontl' The Banyamulengc,
Tutsi shepherds living in the south of Kivu
province who had come from Rwanda at differ-
ent periods and were vrctims of ethnrc cleansing,
took up arms at the end of August 1996 in
opposition to the Zatrian army backed b1' the
Hutu militra'of the former Rwandan regrme The
rebels organised themselves into a movement
knorm as the Alliance of Democratrc Forces for
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. under Laurent-
Desird Kabila, a long-time opponent of the
Mobutu regimc who had always regarded
Mobutu as an rmpostor. In mid-October,
230 000 refugees fled Uvrra, to the south of Lake
Krvu, follou'ing fightrng between the Banya-
mulenge and the Zairran army.
39. As the situatron rvorsened, a summit





Nairobi, Kenya, on 15 December 1996, to drs-
cuss the crisis in the Great Lakes region. There
was evrdent lack of urutv between the various
countnes involved. Zate effectively refused to
talk to Rwanda which it accused, along wrth
Uganda, of fomenting insurrectron in the east of
the country, and protested against the presence of
Rwandan troops in that part of Zaire.
40. On l7 December 1996 Mobutu returned to
Kmshasa after an absence of four months, fol-
lowing an operatron for prostate cancer. The
authorities in Kinshasa, anxious about the partial
loss of two Kiw provinces that had been con-
quered by the rebel forces of Laurent-Desir6
Kabila (the Goma region had fallen under rebel
control on I November 1996), lvere rmpatrent for
his retum. Multi-party elections were to be
organised in May 1997. The "Mardchal", in
power smce the coup d'dtat on 24 November
1965 had, to an extent, been sidelined from
power by the National Conference since 1990
and hoped to be elected Presrdent of Zare at
those elections and thus garn legitimacy. Upon
his return he started reorganrsmg the military
hierarchy' and, on 18 December, appointed Gen-
eral Mahele Bokungo Lieko as Chief-of-Staff of
the Zairian armed forces.
41. On 24 December 1996, Mobutu signed a
decree confirmmg Leon Kengo wa Dondo as
head of a government that had undergone a major
reshuffle and whose first and most urgent task
would be to halt the advance of the rebels
(Banyamulenge of Tutsi origin) controlling the
east of the country. Kengo wa Dondo's con-
tinuation in office had lrttle popular support and
the latter was, moreover, to submrt his resigna-
tion to the President on 24 March 1997 .
42. The essence of developments in 1997 untrl
the takeover of power in Kinshasa by Laurent
Kabila will be dealt wrth in an annex to this re-
port, which will be issued in due course.
(b) Burundi
43. Burundi, a mountainous country of over 6
mrlhon inhabitants, has a populatron made up of
three ethnic groups: the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi
(14%) and the Twa (l%). The first two groups
are in tum drvided mto clans. The clan structure
is of relatively lrttle importance as far as the
Hutu are concerned, but highly influentral in
Tutsi society. Unlike most other Afncan coun-
trres, in Burundi the threc ethnic groups live side
bv srde. the Hutu berng rn the majorrtv in 110
distrrcts and the Tutsr m four. The same lang-
uage, Kirundi, is spoken by all When the Ger-
mans arrlved in Burundr rn 1888, they found a
mainly agrrcultural socrety, wrth no currency,
rvhich was entrrell' Tutsi-dommated. The Hutu
at best rvere regarded as the Tutsi's servants.
Far from changing the existing system, colonial-
rsts merely remforced the Tutsi's de facto sup-
eriority leaving the administration rntact and
adoptrng the pnnciple of indirect government of
the country (the Germans conveyed orders to the
Krng who passed them on to his chiefs and their
underlings).
44. Thus, when the Germans were conquered
m 1916, and the Belgians replaced them in
Burundi, the Hutu were still in a distinctly infer-
ior position in society It was subsequently
thanks to the part played by the missions and to
education that the Hutu were able to secure
higher status positions for themselves although
only in the colonial administration. Wrth one or
two rare exceptions, the native administration
remained closed to them.
45 The Church's contribution to health and
education should be emphasised. Nevertheless
for the whole duration of its mandate, which
lasted until 1962, Belgium never called the prin-
ciple of indrrect admrnistration into question,
u'hich meant that the Tutsi alone had access to
the European rulers.
Acc e s si on to inde pe ndenc e
46. The concept of nationhood took shape, as
in many other countrres of the African continent,
towards the end of the 1950s. A Tutsi Prince,
Louis Rwagasore, founded the Union for
Natronal Progress (Uprona) together with his
Hutu friend, Paul Mirerekano. Belgium was to
do its utmost to stifle asprrations towards inde-
pendence by proposing for example that Hutu
leaders joined the People's Party so that they
alone would gain power in an exclusively Hutu
administration. Louis Rwagasore can be re-
garded as the principle architect of the country's
accession to independence as his parry, Uprona,
won 58 of the 64 seats in Parliament in the 1961
elections. The Uprona leader then formed a gov-
ernment of rvhich he became Prime Minister but
dred in an attack by Tutsis from the opposing
party, the PDC, on 13 October 1961. Independ-
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ence was granted on I July 1962. The Burun-
dran people then chose for their country to con-
tinue to be ruled by,a monarch in the person of
King Mwambutsa IV. The Krng proved unable
to run the country with the result that there were
six successive govemments between 1962 and
t966.
47. Electrons u'ere called in 1965. However
the appointment in October of a Tutsi, Leopold
Biha, as Prime Minrster provoked anger among
the Hutu. Having won the elections, the Hutu
could not accept a government in which key
posts u'ere in the hands of Tutsis and attempted
to overthrorv it by force. The coup failed and
bloody repression was then visited upon Hutu
politicrans irrespective of whether or not they' had
been involved. The King tried to prevent the
slaughter, but one of his ministers, Michel
Micombero, exceeded his authority and had the
politicians executed. The confrontatron between
Hutu and Tutsi was then forced rnto the open.
King Mwambutsa fled to Europe, having been
deposed by his son, Charles Ndizeye (who
acceded to the throne as King Ntare V). He m
tum appointed Captain Micombero as Prime
Minister.
The Micombero years, 1966-1976
48. The republic was born of a coup d'dtat
engineered by Michel Micombero on 28 Nov-
ember 1966 Burundi became a one-party state
where the only legal part)' was Uprona.
Parliament was suppressed, there were no further
elections and accession to power was by co-
option. All the key offrces, including those rn the
arrny, were in Tutsi hands and an apartheid-t1pe
regime, which excluded the Hutu completely,
was set up.
49. Although a number of plots r,''ere savagely
repressed by Micombero it was not until 1972
that the first wave of genocide against the Hutu
took place. In Apnl, Hutu fighters, newly
arrived from Tanzania, wrt}r the intention of
fomenting rebellion agarnst the government,
assassinated Tutsi families. Instead of confining
itself merely to re-establishing order, the army
embarked on a campaign of systematic eradica-
tion of the Hutu, includrng children, the elderly,
the clergl' and women 
- 
no-one was spared.
Some 100-200 thousand people dred in these
massacres. It should be noted that none of those
responsible for the genocide has been prosecuted.
Followrng the genocide. over 100 000 Hutu fled
toTanzania.
50 In 1976, Michel Micombero, a violent
alcoholic, could no longer command much sup-
port, even among the Tutsi, and was overthrown
on I November. He was replaced by Jean-Bap-
trste Bagaza, a Tutsi rvho hailed from the same
province as Micombero (Burun)
Colonel Bagaza's rdgtme, I 976-1 987
51. The new regime offered no ghmmer of
hope to the Hutu who became increasingly mar-
ginalised. The refugees who had left during the
mass killings of 1972 were offered no hope of
reasonable retum. Moreover not only rvas the
Government in Tutsi hands, it was run almost
exclusivelv by natives of Burun province. In
order to strengthen his hold over the Hutu, Jean-
Baptiste Bagaza decided to expel the foreign
missionanes who supported them and clapped
indigenous clergy in prison. His rule was one of
theft, tnbalism, regionalism and masslve corrup-
tion, with the result that when he was overthrown
by the military in 1987, no-one was sorry to see
him go.
The leadershp of Mapr Pierre Buyoya, 1987-
199 3
52. Bagaza's successor came to power on 7
September 1987. He too was drawn from the
ranks of the military, a Tutsi, and from the same
clan, the Bahima, and province as Bagaza.
However he had a reputatron among the interna-
tional community for honesty and farr-mrnded-
ness. Thus there was continuity in change. His
government u,as largely Tutsi (eighteen, to four
Hutus) and the reins of power (army, legal sys-
tem and so on) remamed firmly in Tutsi hands.
Some Hutus, tired of the segregation they suf-
fered from, had some years prevlously created
the Palipehutu Party, based in Tanzanta but with
an extensive network of branches throughout all
of the countries where Hutu exiles lived
53. In August 1988, Hutu from tw'o districts in
north Burundi (Ntega and Marangara) rose up
agamst the army. The President retaliated with
wholesale repression of the rroting in which
20 000 people died (the two communes between
them had 100 000 inhabitants) and which led to a
new exodus of refugees towards Rwanda (more
than 56 000 Hutu took thrs course). The inter-
national community reacted agalnst the measures
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and persuaded Pierre Buyoya to enter rnto politi-
cal dralogue with Mobutu. The Malor then
formed a government wrth equal numbers of
Hutu and Tutsi (12 ministers from each ethnic
group) headed by a Hutu Prime Mrnister, Adrien
Srbomana. However, desprte this apparent
breakthrough, Hutu former civil servants had no
say ur the country's political life and merely
"rubber-stamped" decrsrons taken by Tutsis.
54. In 1990, under pressure from the interna-
tional communitv, notably France (at a French-
African summrt rn La Baule Frangois Mrtterrand
had called upon African heads of state to intro-
duce multi-party sy'stems and organise free elec-
tions in return for French and international aid),
the Burundian President agreed to a return to a
multi-party system, more for reasons of diplo-
macy than by conviction. The Front for Democ-
racy in Burundi (Frodebu) had been set up in
1986 and its numbers rapidly swelled until it
emerged triumphantly into the public eye in
1992. Meantime, Major Buyoya enacted a series
of laws intended to secure the introductron of
democracy. These included a Charter of Na-
tronal Unrty (approved by referendum rn Feb-
ruary l99l), a law on political parties and the
Constitution (10 March 1992).
55. The effect of the move to a multi-party
system was to brrng two parties with large fol-
lowings, the Presrdent's party, Uprona, and
Frodebu, led by Melchior Ndadaye, into confron-
tation with one another. The President wanted at
that point to wrpe out the competition but, faced
with opposition from some ministers, instead
opted for a strategv of demonisation: in other
words, layrng the blame for all the country's ills
on Frodebu and accusing it of being a tribalist
party to discourage people from supporting rt.
56 As the elections approached, the trvo par-
ties mustered their forces. Frodebu, whose
propaganda chief and real strong man was an
individual named Ldonard Nyangoma, caused a
nine-day wonder wrth its 46-pornt programme.
Thus three candidates stood in the Presidential
elections held on I June 1993. The Frodebu
Party candidate, Melchror Ndadaye, won 64.75o/o
of the vote, as against 32.39% for Pierre Buyoya
and 1.44%o for the PRP (Party' for the Recon-
ciliation of the People) representative, Pierre
Sendegeya. The result of the elections came as
both a surpnse and a shock for the Tutsi 6lite in
power: rt was the first time the countn' had had
a Hutu leader. The investiture took place on 10
July 1993. The parliamentary elections that fol-
lowed on 29 June confirmed Frodebu's landshde
victory in 65 seats, against a mere 16 to Uprona
Melchior Ndadal,e decided to form a multi-party',
multi-ethnic reconciliation government (nine
Tutsi and fourteen Hutu ministcrs) headed by a
Tutsi member of Uprona, Mrs Sylvie Kinigi.
Coup d'etat on 2l October 1993 and fis conse-
quences
57. The army refused to accept the election
results and decided to plot a coup, the signal for
which was President Ndadaye's assassination on
2l October 1993 in an arrny military camp. It
was rumoured that Pierre Buyoya was behind the
coup whrch he had stage-managed from behind
the scenes. Other leading figures rvere assassi-
nated on the same day in a bid to annrhilate the
country's leadership. They included for example
the Speaker of the National Assembll,, the Inter-
ior Minister and the wife of the Forergn Affairs
Minister The rest of the leadership took refuge
in the French Embassy until 8 November, before
taking up residence until early 1994 on the shores
of Lake Tangany'ika, close to the Zairran border.
On the morrung of 2l November, Jean-Baptiste
Manrvangari and Jean-Bosco Daradangwe read a
military communique out to the people informing
the natron of the coup Frangois Ngeze then
proclaimed hrmself President of the Republic.
However the authors of the coup held effective
power m the country for onlv five days as they
were totally discredited rnternationally'.
58. Although the responsibilitl, of the army
has been clearly demonstrated, in particular by
the Unrted Nations Commission of Inqurry,
which submitted its final report on 23 Jull' 1996.
none of the guilty parties were prosecuted From
the time the coup was announced, the Hutu lead-
ership called for civil disobedience and the coun-
try people then took revenge on Tutsrs and on
Hutu who supported Uprona. In a sprral of kill-
ings the armr', in an attempt to regain control
over the country, fell upon the Hutu. The num-
ber of victrms were in the thousands and some
600 000 people left for Rwanda According to
Red Cross estimates, the killings in autumn 1993
had left nearly 100 000 dead.
59. Followrng the coup, Sylvestre Ntibantun-
ga.r:rya became President, after the signature of a
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government convention on l0 September 1994,
under pressure from the IIN special representa-
tive, the Mauntanian, Ould Abdallah Others,
such as L6onard Nyangoma, chose exile.
60. Even today, the country is still unsettled,
with confrontation betrveen the two main ethnic
groups. On one side are the Hutu rebels, or
armed gangs, whrch form a grouping wrthin the
National Councrl for the Defence of Democracy
(CNDD) created in March 1994. Their leader,
Leonard Nl'angoma, also heads an armed militia
called the Forces for the Defence of Democracl'
(FDD) that recruits from among the Rwandan
Hutu who have taken refuge in Zaire. Another
Hutu movement, the National Liberation Front
(Frolina) which appears to have its base camp in
Tanzania, is working with the FDD, attacking
essentially the civilian population. The principal
opponents ofthe rebel Hutus are concentrated in
the army, which is largely Tutsi. It is often de-
scribed as mono-ethnic and is supported b1' the
Tutsi militia; also by the local and national pohce
forces and the justice system (rvhere Tutsts
largely predominate).
61. Violence in Burundr has continued smce
October 1993 when Melchior Ndadaye was as-
sassinated. Since then, the death tolls have been
devastating. In 1995, for example, at least
15 000 people lost their lives. The same year,
the Tutsis attempted to clear Bujumbura of its
entrre Hutu population. Accordrng to Mideans
sans Frontrires, more than 150 000 people ap-
pear to have died since 1993. Hence Burundi is
currently riven by de facto apartheid.
62. In June 1996 France put an end to its
military cooperatron with Burundi. The same
month the International Committee of the Red
Cross decided to suspend operations in Burundi
after the death of three of its members
63. By 1996 the country's capital had become
a real-life expenmental laboratory for preventivc
drplomacy, in particular through the steps taken
by former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere.
The idea of sendrng an Afrrcan force of 25 000
soldiers to Burundi took shape at the Arusha
summit rvhich opened in June 1996. However
the Burundran army opposed it. President
Ntibantunganya, repudiated by the people on 22
Julv, took refuge in the American Embassy.
There rvas a power vacuum at the top and
Buy'oya returned to fill it on 25 July 1996 at the
invitatron of the army, rnrtrally bringing calm to
the country as a whole.
64. Since July 1996 Bujumbura has been cut
off from the rest of the world The last commu-
rucations route overland between Burundi and
Rwanda, the frontier post on the RN 1, was
closed in 1996. Since October 1996 differences
within the international community have emerged
as to the attrtude to be adopted towards Burundi.
The European Union, speaking through its spe-
cral envoy in the Great Lakes region, Aldo
Alello, is dissociating itself from the economic
embargo. The rvisdom of the embargo has been
widely challenged on humanitarian grounds by
aid organrsations like Unicef, which is asking at
least to be allowed to help chrldren. Moreover,




65. After the Berlin conference in 1885, the
region became part of the German emprre. A
German military command was established in
Kigali in 1908, whrle porver of government was
vested in the Mrvami, or King, born of a Tutsi
dynast1,. German domination lasted only until
l9l6 when Belgran troops invaded the country as
part of alhed operatrons against Germany's east
Afrrcan possessions. ln 1924, Belgium accepted
the supervisorv mandate over Rwanda and
Burundr entrusted to rt by the SDN.
66. In the 1930s Hutu chiefs were almost sys-
tematically ousted from key posts in government
and replaced by Tutsis. In 1931 the Belgrans
effectively deposed King Musinga and under his
successor, Mutara Rudahrgwa, the country be-
carne yet more subservient to the Catholtc
Church and Tutsi supremacy. Hence on the eve
of independence, 43 out of 45 of the country's
leaders were Tutsi.
67. In the late 1950s nationalism, both Hutu
and Tutsr, emerged and with it the desire for
independence. The Catholic Church at the time
supported Hutu clarms. Thus it came about that
from 1933 onwards the newspaper Kinyamateka,
rvhrch increasingly' supported the nationalist
cause, u'as pubhshed by the Arbishopric of Kap-
gayi. Gregorre Kay'ibanda, who was to be
Ru'anda's first President, became the news-
paper's chief edrtor rn 1954. Belgian Catholic
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circles therefore supported the nationalist cause
in Rwanda, hoprng to prevent the country, whrch
found itself involved willy nrlly in East-West
rivalry, sliding towards communism. Addrtron-
ally. Belgium wanted to maintain good relafions
with Rwanda because of its geographic posrtion
and notably because of its proxrmity to its huge
neighbour, Zaire.
68. In 1957 the Bahutu Manifesto appeared;
this had the approval ofthe Cathohc Church and
was pubhshed bl' the Parmehutu Party under the
leadershrp of Gregoire Kayibanda. It challenged
Tutsi de facto supremacy in all areas and put
forward the idea that the Tutsi were not indig-
enous to Rwanda. Thrs document is regarded as
the foundrng document of the "Hutu revolution"
calling for Hutu independence from both the
Belgrans and the Tutsi.
69. In 1959, when the IIN took over tle
supervlsory mandate formerll' entrusted to
Belgrum by the SDN, King Mutara died under
crrcumstances that left unclear whether or not he
may have been the victim of assassination. He
was immediately replaced by Kigeri V. The
same year Unar (the Rwandese National Union)
rvas formed, with a largely Tutsi membership,
rvhrch called for the country's immediate
independence and challenged the role of the
Church.
Rwandan mdependence under the Presidency of
Grdgove Kaybanda
70. In November 1959 an event took place
that became known in history as Rrvandan All
Saints Day. Colonel Guy Logiest, a commrs-
sioned headquarters staff officer, rvho nou' repre-
sented the colonial power, came out in support of
the Hutu revolution and its leader Gregoire
Kayibanda; hence the Hutu could exact reprisals
agarnst the Tutsi with impunity and not be prose-
cuted. The Hutu eliminated a part of the Tutsi
elite, leading to over 20 000 deaths.
71. On 28 January 1961, the abolitron of the
monarchy was approved b1' referendum. This
was follorved b1' the proclamation of the Repub-
lic of Ru'anda on I July' 1962. In the parliamen-
tary'elections held in September l96l the Parme-
hutu Partl' confirmed lts supremacy by wirulng
35 out of 44 seats. The partl' lvas held together
largely by its total rejection of the Tutsi so that
the new regime quickll, degenerated into racism.
Tutsis were defined as foreigners whose presence
was tolerated but who could be krlled without
any investigation of their murder The first
political parties were therefore established along
ethnic lines, approved of by and large b1' the
colonial power, which had supported the Tutsi
elite from the outset only to encourage the
emergence in the 1950s of a Hutu 6lrte.
72 On26 October 1961, Gregoire Kayibanda
became Presrdent. Successrve waves of violence
follorved. each produclng a mass exodus of
Tutsi. Thus by 1964, 150 000 Tutsis had al-
ready taken refuge in neighbouring countries,
principally Burundi and Zatre. A number even
went to Europe, then to Canada and the United
States.
General Habyarimana's rd gr me
73. On 5 July 1973, a Hutu from the north of
the country, General Juvenal Habyarimana,
serzed power in a coup d'itat from Gregorre
Kayrbanda, who was from the south. Far from
seeking to allay ethnic tension, Habvarimana
inflamed it by establishing a quota system (10%)
particularlf in universrties and in administrative
departments, gradually ousting Tutsr from posts
of responsibrlitl' and ultimately Hutu not native
to his own reglon. The establishment of a one-
part)'state then follorved and a new constitution
was adopted in 1978
74. The Banyaru'anda (made up of "native"
Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, born on
Ugandan territorl', immigrants, mainly Hutu,
who had come to Rrvanda in the 1920s and
1930s and refugees, almost exclusively Tutsi,
rvho had arrived between 1959 and 1961 in flight
from the massacres which accompanied the
Rwandan revolution) and Tutsi exrles (rn Bur-
undi, Kenya, Uganda and Zatre) created the
Ru'andan Alliance for National Unitf in 1979.
In 1987 this became the Rwandan Patriotrc Front
(RPF)
1990-94: the begrnrungs of genoude
75. The RPF, under the leadership of Fred6ric
Rrvigl'ema, the Ugandan Deputl' Defence Minis-
ter, invaded northern Ru'anda on I October
1990. The attack u'as repelled by the Rwandan
Armed Forces u'ith assrstance from France (300
parachutrsts), Belgium (500 soldiers) and Zaire
(500 soldrers) Thousands of Tutsi rn Rwanda
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were then arrested suspected of belonging to or
supporting the Rwandan Patnotrc Front. Rebels
began a guerrilla action rn the north ofthe coun-
try.
76 From 1990 onwards, Tutsis were mas-
sacred with increasing frequencv in Rwanda
Two Hutu parties, one a branch of the National
Republican Movement for Development and
Democracy (NRMD the single parly in power
since independence) and the Republican Defence
Coalrtron (CDR) lvere both professrng racist
ideology Wrth the connivance of the army thev
set up two structures that would provide the
means of extermination: the militia and the
popular press. The Interhamwe (literally "those
who attack together" or sohdarity movement)
drawn from the younger ranks of the NRMD and
the Impuzamugambi ("those driven by a single
goal") belongrng to the CDR, soon numbered
approximately 50 000 and carried out punitive
expeditions both against Tutsr crvilians and any
Hutus in favour of reconcrliation. In 1993 and
1994 these militia were receiving actrve support
(arms and military training) from the Rwandan
Armed Forces.
77. The media, described b1, western analysts
as a "hate press" also played a major part in the
development of an antr-Tutsist ideology. In 1993
circles close to Presrdent Habyarimana set up a
pnvate radio station, the RTLM ("Free radio-
television of a thousand hills") which became the
essential weapon of the Hutu extremtsts and mt-
litia, while in December 1990 the monthly news-
paper Kangara published the Bahutu ten com-
mandments, of which the eighth stated that Hutus
should cease to feel pity for Tutsis The news-
paper was opposed to any negotiation lvrth the
Rwandan Patriotic Front.
78. However from 1990 onn'ards, calls for
democracy were at the same trme being raised
within the country, particularly follorvrng the La
Baule appeal, in rvhich President Mitterrand of
France linked increased aid wrth progress to-
wards democracy' in Afrrcan countries.
79. On l0 June l99l a new Constrtution was
enacted which provided for a multiparty system
and led to the recognition of nine political parties
by the end of 1991. The start ofnegotiations led
on l2 July 1992 to a ceasefire under the auspices
of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and
the rmplementation of an agreement on forming
an interim government. However, hopes u'ere
shortlived, as the rebels launched a nerv offenstve
on 8 February 1993. The Tutsr rebels of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front continued therr advance
wrthin the country killing entire Hutu families en
route. This offensrve led to the exodus of a mil-
hon Hutu refugees. The Rrvandan Armed Forces
whose number rose from 5 000 in 1990 to
35 000 in 1993, no longer seemed able to put up
an)' reslstance, untrl Paris came to their aid,
forhng the Uganda-backed invasion.
80. Moreover on 8 March 1993, following a
vrsrt by Afrrca Watch 
- 
International Rrghts Fed-
eratron fromT-2lJanuary 1993, the Commission
of Inqurry on Human Rrghts Violatrons in
Rwanda smce I October 1990 published a devas-
tating report on human rights violations in that
country. Over I 000 people appeared to have
died since the October 1990 rvar and nearly
350 000 to have been drsplaced. Belgium re-
called its Ambassador and other European coun-
tries threatened Rwanda with sanctions.
81. However the belligerents seemed to find an
area of agreement srnce, at a meeting in Arusha
in Tanzania, on 4 August 1993, after 12 months
of negotratrons, they signed a peace treaty
providing for an organised return of refugees
(numberrng one milhon according to a Red Cross
estrmate), the settrng-up of an interim govern-
ment and parliament which would rnclude the
Rrvandan Patriotrc Front and the establishment
of the INAMIR (the UN Assistance Mission to
Rrvanda). The latter came into berng on 5 Octo-
ber I993, under UN Security Council Resolutron
872, and consrsted of 2 500 troops from 23
countrres. However the Arusha accords were
never implemented by President Habl,arimana,
who could not reach agreement wrth the Rwan-
dan Patriotic Front on the allocatron of portfolios
rn the interim governrnent.
The Rwandan genocide of 1994
82. On 6 April 1994. President Habyanmana
and hrs Burundran colleague, Cyprren Ntari-
yamira, lvere killed when their plane was brought
down by ground-to-air missiles on their return
flight from Tanzama where the President had
been taking part in further negotiations. Even
todal', lt rs strll not known for certain who was
behind the assassination 
- 
the Rwandan Patriotic
Front or Hutu extremists opposed to sharing
power wrth thc Tutsr. On 7 April the Rwandan
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Pnme Mrnister, Agathe Uwilingiymana, several
opposrtion leaders and ten Belgian blue berets
were assassrnated. Follou'rng the death of the
President, while Rwandan Patriotic Front sol-
drers were advancing inexorably on Kigah, sys-
tematlc extermination of Tutsrs began. Churches
in particular rvere targeted and the most horrific
massacres took place there. The RTLF went on
broadcastrng in the following vein: ''the clean-up
of the Tutsis should finally be completed by 5
Ma\'" or "\'e must not make the same mistake as
in 1959. Children must be done away with".
83. In the face of the orgy of killing which
overwhelmed Rwanda, Belgrum and France
evacuated their natronals, whrle on 22 April the
number of blue berets was reduced from 2 500 to
270 troops (under Security Council Resolution
921) and an arrns embargo enacted on 17 May.
84. On I I June 1994 the OAU Ministerial
Council adopted a resolution calling for a ccase-
fire in Rwanda, and condemned the massacres,
describing them as crimes against humanitl'.
France declared itself ready to intervene along
with its European partners, an initiative sup-
ported (on 17 June) by Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
On 22 June the UN Securr[' Council adopted
Resolution 929, authorising France and other
countries that were able to take part in the
humanitarian operation in Rwanda to employ all
necessary means over a two-month period to
protect civilians and guarantee distribution of
food aid. Less than a r,r'eek later the first de-
tachments of Operation Turquoise, consisting of
2 500 French soldiers mobilised for'a period of
tw'o months, entered Rwanda v\a Zaire. They
were to be replaced by African blue berets in
August GTNAMIR II - Securrty Council Resolu-
tion 918 of 17 May). In July 1994, the Interna-
tronal Committee of the Red Cross estimated the
number of deaths since 6 April at around a mil-
Iion
85. On 4 Jull', RPF forces seized Kigali and
on the following day France created a safe hu-
manitarian zone in the south-rvest of the country
u'ithin the framework of Operation Turquoise.
86. The RPF (former Tutsr rebel force) has
been in power since July 1994. It declared the
war over on l8 July and announced the appoint-
ment of Pastor Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu, as
President and of Faustin Twagiramungu as
Prime Minister, with General Kagame as Vice-
President.
87. From July 1994, the refugee camps, and m
particular the outbreak of cholera in the Goma
camp m Zare, led to massive concern worldwide
and the launch of Operation Support Hope by the
United States on 26 Jull'. Trvo mrllion refugees
were herded into camps rn Zaire and Tanzania,
whrle some 350 000 erstwhile refugees returned
to Rwanda. The entrre fabric of government and
socret)'norv needs to be rebuilt
88. At the end of June 1994 the special rap-
porteur for the UN Human Rrghts Committee
submitted a report concludrng that the term
genocide was correctly applied as far as the mas-
sacres of the Tutsi were concerned and recom-
mending that an international criminal tribunal
should be set up to try those responsible. The
United Nations set up the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda on 6 November 1994
(Resolution 955) at the initiatrve of Rrchard
Goldstone, the then Prosecutor for the Interna-
tional Crrminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
The Rrvandan Tnbunal's task is to prosecute, try
and sentence those responsible for the Rwandan
genocrde.
89 It was not until 27 December 1996 that the
first hearings on the 1994 genocide opened in
Rwanda. Almost 90 000 persons, largely Hutu,
suspected of taking part in this genocide, are
awaiting trial in prison under extremely precan-
ous conditions. The Government has published a
hst of I 900 people eligible for the death penals,
Meanrvhile, since the beginning of December,
over 600 000 refugees have returned from Zate
(in flight from the fightrng between the Zariarr
rebels and the Government), 200 000 from
Burundi and more than 350 000 from Tanzania,
which has set the deadline for closure of the
camps at 3l December.
(d) Uganda
From Brttish rule to mdependence
90. Uganda, wrth over l8 million rnhabitants,
is home to two major ethnic groups: the Bantus
in the south, makrng up approximately two-thirds
of the total populatron 
- 
the main trrbe being the
Buganda 
- 
and the Nilotic and Sudanese peoples
in the north (Langos, Achohs, etc.). In the l6th
century, the Bunyoro kingdom of the Kitaras and
the Buganda kingdom achieved supremacy over
t7
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the tlventl,or so krngdoms into whrch the country
was then divrded. By the late l8th century the
Buganda kingdom had gained sole ascendancv.
It rvas govemed by an absolute monarch, the
Kabaka, rvho rvas regarded as sacred In the
l9th century the Kabaka Mtesa, consrdcring
himself threatened to the north by Egyptran ex-
pansion, extended a welcome to the Enghsh ex-
plorer, John Speke, rn 1862 and later to Stanley'
in 1875. From 1877 onuards, missronaries of
the Church Missionary Socretl' arnved in Rub-
aga; they were follorved in 1879 by the French
White Fathers. Religious feuding started very
soon after, resulting in persecution of the
Christians by the new Kabaka of Buganda,
Mwanga (rn'ho reigned from 1884 to 1897) from
the time of his accessron to power (massacre of
the Ugandan Catholic martyrs, 1884-1885).
91. On I July 1890 an Anglo-German agree-
ment was reached under which the German Gov-
ernment ceded its entitlement to the region to the
British. The Brrtrsh East-African Company then
sought to extend its rnfluence In December
1890 it gave command of rts troops to one Cap-
tain Lugard, who imposed a British Protectorate
rn 1894. Mwanga rebelled rn 1897 but n'as
beaten by the English rvho replaced him rvith his
son In 1900 the English granted the Kabaka of
Buganda the privileges he rvas to retam through-
out the entrre colonial penod In 1916, on the
rnitiative of Governor H. Bell and the agricul-
tural commrssioner, Simpson, the decision u'as
taken to close Uganda to whrte coloruahsm, thus
turning the country into a natron of small peasant
producers of export crops (princrpalll' cotton and
coffee).
92. Thus at the time of independence, Euro-
pean colonials numbered no more than l0 000 or
so; immigration from India vvas far greater.
During the colonial period a system of indrrect
rule applied rvhere the colonial power worked
through the existing administrative structures.
The missions were made responsible for health
and educational mfrastructure Hence mainland
Britain barely subsidised the protectorate at all
93. Under this sy'stem nationalism was a rcla-
tively late development rn Uganda. It was onl1,m
Buganda, the richest and most densely-populated
province rvhcre school attendance rates were
among the highest in Black Afnca, that there was
some degree of polrtical life. It rvas not untrl the
late 1950s that two political partrcs cmerged, the
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) led by Dr
Mrlton Obote. whrch claimed to represent the
nghts of all ethnrc groups, and the Kabaka
Yekka, u'hich sought to maintam the absolute
ascendano' of the king of Buganda. Thc 1961
general electrons vvere fought between the UPC
and the Democratic Party, (DP). The latter
emerged the victor but Mrlton Obote chose to
ally himself with the Kabaka Yekka (KY) rn
order to squeeze out the Democratic Partl' The
Constitution u'as drarm up at the London Con-
ference, attended by the three partres. It came
into force on I March 1962
94. A coalrtron government rvas established rn
spring of 1962 Great Brrtarn granted Uganda
independence on 9 October 1962. Independent
Uganda \\'as made up of four kingdoms,
Buganda, Bunvoro, Toro and Ankold (and one
territorv, Busoga). The first of these had impor-
tant powers (havrng sole responsibrlitl'for certain
matters). Buganda also had an rndependent pol-
ice force and certain financial pnvrleges. The
first President of the nerv republic was the
Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II, with Mrlton
Obote as his Prime Minister. Horvever a series
of difficulties arose betrvcen the Head of State
and the Prime Mimster rvho u'anted a unitarl,
state. The affair known as the "lost accounts"
(areas of the krngdom of Bun'oro, previously
ceded to Buganda by Great Britain, but which
Bunvoro u'as able to recover with support from
Mrlton Obote), the disproportionate influence of
the Buganda in the Ugandan state and the per-
sonalitl' of the Prime Mrnrster himself were
among factors that precipitated a crisis.
Mrlton Obote's stranglehold on the country
95. Under Obote, the regime became progres-
srvely harsher. In Fcbruarl' 1966 the Kabaka
was deposed Meeting with opposrtion from
other ethnic groups. Obote put an end to consti-
tutronal rule and concentrated power m his oun
hands, becoming head of government on 15
Aprrl On 8 September 1967 a new constitutron
- 
the so-called "republican constitution" 
- 
put an
end to the existence of the kingdoms. At that
point Uganda became a unitary state divided into
18 districts, each with an clccted councrl and a
local executive, u.ith the central administratron
represented by the district commrssioner. The
President rvas also the head of government and
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the head of the armed forces (Mrlton Obote was,
m additron, the leader of his own party', the UPC
- 
Uganda People's Congress). The regrme be-
came increasingly authoritarian (proclamatron of
a state of emergency in 1969, outlarving of politi-
cal parties) and President Obote turned to socral-
ism, in particular by nationahsrng the banks and
European companies.
Dictatorshp of ldt Arun Dada. 1971-1979
96. On 24 January l97l General Idi Amin
Dada, Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces and a
member of the Nilotrc Kakrva tribe, led a military
coup and acceded to porver. Constrtutional guar-
antees were abohshed and basic freedoms with-
drawn. General Amin, rvho soon became Head
of State, proclaimed himself Presrdent (by decree
of 13 March 1971) and proceeded to dissolve
parliament and partly suspended the constrtutron.
Former President Obote succeeded in taking ref-
uge in Tanzmia. A reign of terror set in betrveen
1972 and 1978 in which no opposrtron of any'
kind was tolerated. The President carned out a
prograrnme of systematic Africanrsation of
Uganda, firing his fellow-citizens with national-
istic fervour and expelling tens of thousands of
Indians under appalling conditions Uganda suf-
fered economrc and political decline until well
into the late 1980s
97 At rnternatronal level, President Amin, a
fanatical muslim, broke off relations with Israel
in 1972, and was actively supported by Libya,
Saudi Arabra and the USSR, rvhile Uganda's
relations rvith Great Brrtain and Tanzania un-
derwent serious deterioration. He adopted an
attitude of radical opposition to Zionism, going
so far as to advocate the total destructron of the
State of Israel. In the same vein, he caused out-
rage among rvestern powers with his apologra for
Hitler. On 27 June 1976 an Arr France arrbus
u'as hrghjacked by Palestinians and landed at
Entebbe arrport. On 3 July an Israeli commando
pulled offa surpnse attack, freeing the hostages.
98. Uganda was also laying claim to swathes
of Tanzanian and Kenyan tcrritory. In Novem-
ber 1978. followrng a border skirmish rn the
Kagera reglon, the Tanzamans, headed by
Nyerere, set up a Uganda National Liberation
Front with support from numerous resrstance
movements opposed to the military dictatorship.
The Uganda Natronal Liberation Arml' beat back
the Ugandan army and eventually took control of
the whole of Uganda in April 1979 Presrdent
Amin, notwithstanding support from some nergh-
bounng countnes (Libya, Sudan), rvas forced
into exile.
99 But there was still no return to stabrlrtl,
within the country. A newll-formed government
u'as given responsibility by the National Front
for the Liberation of Uganda to run the country's
affairs in accordance rvith four principles:
national unitl', democracy, independence and so-
cial progress, under the control of a National
Consultative Council rntended to act as a parlia-
ment. Horvever the nerv head of government,
Yusuf Lule, a moderate mushm who had been
the former Chancellor of the University of Mak-
erere, proved incapable of dealing rvith the wrde-
spread anarchv and moreover was suspected of
Bugandan sympathies and of being too enthusi-
astlc a supporter of private capitahsm. He rvas
forced to resign on 20 June in favour of Godfrel,
Binaisa.
Rettrrn to power ofMilton Obote, 1980-1985
100. Binaisa managed to hold on to power for
almost a year before being forced out of office on
12 May 1980 by a "military committee". Parlia-
mentarl' elections finally took place on l0 Dec-
ember 1980 u'hen the Uganda People's Congress,
the moderate socralist party of former President
Obote, obtained an absolutc majority (74 out of
126 seats) notrvithstandrng the fact that Obote
was accused of having falsified the results, to the
detriment rn particular of the Uganda Patriotic
Movement created b1' Yoweri Museveni.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Obote was
appornted Presrdent on 15 December 1980 and
formed a government dominated bv those loyal to
him (includrng Paul Mwanga who rvas to become
Vice President). The National Assembly met for
the first time in late 1981 and a semblance of
multi-part1, democracy was maintained
(represented essentially by the Democratic Pafi'
led by Pierre Ssemogerere). Musevem opted for
violent action and began a guerrilla rvar m the
w'est of the country'
l0l. The neu' Obote regime w'as faced with the
difficult task of restonng an economy in total
chaos. As a regime intended to be economically
self-sufficrent, Uganda's onlv export was coffee
and the countr)' had no trade outlets by sea or by
rail However financial assistance from intema-
tional organrsations such as the International
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Development Associatron and the Internatronal
Monetary Fund (IMF) made rt possible to turn
round the economy within tro years of Obote's
return to power.
102. Moreover, durrng the earl1, 1980s, the
President had to deal rvith opposition on several
fronts, not only armed opposrtion from
Museveni's National Resistance A.rny, but also
from the numerous political movements which
sprang up in or outside the country (such as
Lule's National Resistance Movement, based in
London rvhere Lule had taken refuge). The
natronal armed forces under the command of
Oyite Olock unleashed a spate of reprisals
agarnst rards that were becoming rncreasingly
daring. The crvrhan population was the vrctrm of
a situation that was turning into anarchl'. famine,
forced mrgratron, score settling betrveen neigh-
bounng ethnic groups, etc.
103. However, on 29 July 1985 the armv,50o/o
of rvhich was draun from the Acholi ethnrc
minority, assumed po\ver under the leadership of
Colonel Tito Okello. Obote u'as forced to take
refuge in Keny'a then in Zalrtbia. A provisional
nrnc-member militarl- council rvas established,
succeeded shortly' aftenvards by a civilian gov-
ernment lvhrch rncluded factrons draun from the
Democratrc Party' rncludrng Pierre Ssemogerere,
and even representatives from the Ugandan
People's Congress. The major question then was
rvhether You'err Musevenr rvould support the
govemment
Uganda under Yoweri Museveni, since 1986
104. In January 1986, the Natronal Resrstance
A.*y, made up of southern and u'estern tnbes,
put an end to the massacres and took power
Musevini became President on 29 January Nerv
disturbances broke out in 1988 close to the bor-
der rvith Kenya through rvhich most of Uganda's
trade passed The new goverrrment tried to rc-
build the countrl. and deal rvith sporadic guerrilla
movements rn the north A strange sect, the Hol1,
Sprrrt Movement (HSM) sprang up, insprred b1,
Pnestess Ahce Lakrvena, rvhose followers at-
tacked the Natronal Resrstance Arml'armed onlv
u'ith tahsmans Hos'ever in November 1987 the
defeat the movement suffered forced Lakwena,
uho rvas herself rvounded, to take refuge in
Kenl'a Domestrc politrcs u'ere also plagued b1'
securitl' problems until 1989.
105. An apphcation for IMF assistance was
again made in order to revrve the country's econ-
omy and two structural adlustment plans rvere
rmplemented in 1987 and 1989. leading to the
drsmrssal of thousands of civil scrvants. In order
to head off a politrcal crisis, President Muscvenr
then moved to rernstate democracv. Proscription
of polrtical parties rvas lifted in 1992, although
thev u'ere not allou'ed to be represented rn the
electron of the Constrtuent Assembly in 1994.
The results \\'ere an endorsement of the existing
government u'hrch had shoun srgns of a wrlling-
ness to compromise by sanctioning the restora-
tion of the tradrtronal Bugundan monarchy, on 31
July 1993, and the coronation of Mutebi II.
106. Museveni was re-elected as the country's
leader on 9 May 1996, with 74.20 of the vote.
On 27 June 1996 the first democratrcally-elected
parliament returned the Presidentral party, the
National Resistance Movement, by an over-
rvhelming majorrtl' as the ballot had been boy'-
cotted by the major opposition groupings. The
latter felt that the President. u'ho had been
elected in May, orved his victorl'only to massive
fraud and u'ere extremelv unhappl' about the
su'ingeing defeat inflicted on its main candrdate,
Prerre Ssemogerere, u'ho had the support of fol-
lou'ers of former President Milton Obote, as well
as of the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army). How-
ever, 120 international observers and foreign
diplomats felt that the ballot had been farr.
107 The government also still has to deal wrth
the manl'guerrilla movements that proliferate in
Uganda. Hence the Lord's Resrstance Army, a
Christran inspired movement supported b1' Isla-
mrst Sudan, seems to want to wreak vengeance
against Uganda for the latter's support to the
Christian rebels m southern Sudan urth the
Unrted States' blessing. A guernlla rvar has con-
sequently been raging rn the Gulu and Krtgum
area in the north of the countrJ' for thc last ten
years The inhabitants are terrorised by the LRA
and rts mystrcal leader Joseph Kony', rvho, rt is
sard, goes everr,u'here accompanied by a lamb on
a leash and rvhose particular specialrty is krd-
nappmgs Besides thrs, Uganda has to u'ithstand
attacks from tu'o other rebel factions, the West
Nile Bank Front (WNBF) headed bl,Juma Oris,
also supported b1' Sudan, and the Allied Demo-
cratrc Movement (ADM) led by Jamir Mukulu,
supported b1' Zave Both are challenging the
results of the electrons held on 9 May 1996 and
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demanding a return to a multr-party system.
These three armed groups are the cause of
Uganda's devoting over 20o/o of its budget to the
armed forces.
108. Other rebel movements such as the Ugan-
dan Federal Democratic Alliance also surface
sporadicalll,, giving commentators the impression
that thrs proliferatron of gucrrilla movements
may presage the fall of the Museveni rdgrme,
despite the populanty the latter is enjoying
thanks to the country's spectacular economlc
recovery, and the stabilitv it has brought to a
country that has lurched from coup d'dtat to
dictatorship since it achieved independence in
1962. On thc economic front, Uganda is also
hoprng to develop its export markets through
COMESA (the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern African States), a regronal accord to
u'hich Uganda and 16 other Afncan countries
became party in December 1994.
109 Frnally, Musevini is at prescnt suspected,
essentially' bv France and Zaire of being the main
source of support for the rebel forces of Laurent-
D6sire Kabila in Zare. France also holds
against Kampala the assistance the latter appears
to have given the FPR in brrngrng down the suc-
cessors of President Habl'arimana (rvho had
Pans's support). At the same time, the United
States is supplying Uganda with militarl' aid to
enable the latter to defend itself against possible
aggression from Sudan Uganda also broke off
diplomatic relatrons with that countr)' in Apnl
1995 Hence. man\r commentators regard Ugar-
da as the theatre u'here a slmbohc struggle is
berng played out between the Unrted States and
France to acqurre ascendancy over the heart of
Africa. The Ugandan Presrdent dcnies such in-
tcrference and takes the view that local conflicts
should be resolved locally. Hc also denies that
Ugandan forces arc involved in supportrng
Kabila in any u'ay.
III. Genocide in Africa
110. As u'as pointed out in Chapter II of the
present report, massacres and genocrde have been
perpetrated on several occaslons in the Great
Lakes region m the recent past. Onll, during the
last genocide in 1994, when more than 500 000
Tutsi were killcd, rvas actron taken by' the inter-
national community to prosecute and sentence the
perpetrators.
I I 1. It should be noted that the United Nations
General Assembly adoptcd a "Convention on the
preventron and punishment of the cnme of geno-
crde" on 9 December 1948. In thrs Conventron.
genocide rs defined as follows.
"Genocide means any of the follorving acts
committed with intent to destroy, in rvhole
or rn part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such (a/ killing mem-
bers of the group, (b) cawrng scnous
bodily, or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) deliberatelf inflicting on the
group conditions of lifc calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or
rn part; (d) imposing measures intended to
prevent births rvithin the group; (e) for-
cibly transferring chrldren of the group to
another group."
ll2. The Genocide Convention of 1948 did not
establish an internatronal crimrnal tribunal
marnll' because this proposal was relected by
most states on the grounds of natronal sover-
eignty, but Article VI of the Convention provrdcs
for "such international penal tribunal as mav
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contract-
ing Partres rvhich shall have accepted rts luris-
diction".
ll3. On the other hand, Article VIII of the
Convention stipulates that :
"Any Contracting Partl'may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to
take such action under the Charter of the
United Natrons as they consrder appropn-
ate for the prevention and suppression of
acts of genocide or any of the other acts
enumeratcd in Artrcle III."
ll4 As soon as some form of pubhc order had
been re-established in Rwanda, efforts were
made to examine the genocidal massacres which
had taken place earlier rn the year. The UN Sec-
uritv Council, in Resolution 935 of I July 1994,
set up a Commission of Experts to investrgate
grave humanitarian violations including acts of
genocide and the cxperts u'ere appointed on I
August. The Rwandan President, Pasteur Bizi-
mungu. stressed thc importance of an interna-
tronal tnbunal on crimes against humanity in
Rwanda. The tribunal's mandate was to
prosecute those responsible for genocrde and
other serious vrolations of mternatronal human-
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itanan law committed in Rrn,anda between I
January and 3l December 1994.
I15. Rwanda had voted against Resolutron 955
because it u'anted the tribunal to be able to im-
pose the death sentence and the trials to be held
in Rwanda. It would also have preferred to grve
the tribunal competence to rule on events since
1990. The report pubhshed by the Commission
of Experts on 2 December 1996 included evi-
dence which supported Rwanda's argument that
war crimes investigatrons should cover the period
from 1990.
116. On 27 November 1995, the IIN tribunal
based in Arusha, Tanzanta, formally started rts
u'ork but was criticised for rts slow progress
The composition of the trrbunal was confirmed in
May 1995 but investigations rvere hampered by
lack of funds, disputes between agencies and the
late deployment of investrgators, who rvere often
inexperienced.
ll7 . In February 1997. an internal UN report
strongly criticised the way the tribunal operated
It mentioned "mismanagement in almost all areas
of the tribunal and frequent vrolations of UN
rules and regulations", but also "personnel in ke1'
positrons [rn,ho] did not have the required
qualifications"r. At that time. eleven accused
were in custody at the tribunal's headquarters
and indictments had been prepared against a
further ten.
IV. A right to military intemention?
ll8. The numerous internal conflrcts in Afnca,
often accompanied by' serious violations of
human rrghts and humanitarian drsaster, quite
naturalll'prompt one to ask x'hat can be done to
stop such conflrcts once thel' have erupted. In
other r,r'ords, do international organisations or
other states have a right to intervene militarily on
the terrrtory of a sovereign state and, rf so, what
are the conditions that determine intervention??
' The Economist,22Februarl' 1997.t O., the subject of humanitanan rnterventlon, see
also Patrick J. O'Halloran. Humanrtanan
Intervention and the genoctde tn Rwanda. rn
Conflict Studies 2'77, January' 1995, Research
Institute for the Study of Conflrct and Terrorism,
London.
119. The rrght of a regional grouprng of states
or the United Nations to "perpetrate an act of
aggression or a direct milrtary rntervention
against others" rs not authonsed under interna-
ronal lau'. This pnncrple was established b1'the
International Court of Justice in the Corfir
Charurel decision whrch states
"The claimed right of intervention cannot
be considered by the court as more than a
manifestation of a policy' of force, a policy
rvhich in the past has grven rise to senous
crises, and which should not be allor,r'ed,
whatever its merits, to exist in rnterna-
tional larv Intervention of u'hatever type
.. favours stronger nations and could as
such lead to mrscarriage of justrce and the
wrong administration of mternatronal
law "
120. The UN Charter clearly prohibits foreign
intervention in a sovereign state and thrs has been
confirmed by the General Assembly. Reference
is made here to:
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN
Charter, stating that "All members
shall refrain in their international
rclatrons from the threat or use of force
against the territorral integrity or
polrtrcal rndependence of any statc, or
in any other manner mconsistent rvith
the purposes of the United Nations",
Article 2 (7) of the Charter which
states that: "Nothing contained in the
prescnt Charter shall authorise the
United Nations to intervene in matters
u'hrch are esscntially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state".
General Assemblv Resolution 2l3l (21
December 1965) rvhich "condemns"
armed intervention and all other forms
of interference rvith a state or its
politrcal. economic and social elements;
General Assembly Resolutron 2625
(25) prohibiting dircct or rndirect
lntervention
l2l Durrng the cold lvar, overt militarl'
intervention was also excluded in practice
bccause of prohfic usc of the vcto by members
of the UN Secunty Council.
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122 Often, intervention rvas not constdered
desirable because it risked destabilising rul-
nerable states on the penphery and dnvmg them
into the hands of the adversary'. The excuse for
not intervening was cloaked in terms of nattonal
sovereignty and self-determination On the other
hand, it should be noted that this officially
acknorvledged pohcy was at the same trme the
ultimate hypocrisl' Both superpowers indulged
in subversive action to topplc unfriendly regimes,
incite rebelhons or prompt ctvtl wars, all rn order
to stem or reverse the influence of the other
superpower.
123. After the cold \\'ar, rvork started on
alternate defimtions and concepts of security'.
The end of the bipolar world has made regtons of
conflict more accessible to intervention but at the
same time, there seems to be less urgenc)' to act
because the battle between the superpowers for
spheres of influence is over and many regions
have lost much of their strategic lnterest
124 In post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa,
milrtary intervention in the internal affairs of a
state has mostly taken place at the specrfic
request of that state. Bascd upon its military
agreements with a number of states, tt was al-
most exclusivell' France which made specifically-
targeted, limrted, rapid and generalll' successful
interventrons its speciality. The objective of
these interventlons, apart from commg to the res-
cue of French and other foreign citizens or pro-
tecting French proper[', u'as usually to restore
order, quell rcbellions or squash mutirues at an
early stage. Because they rvere based upon exist-
ing defence agreements, there rvas no need for
UN approval
125 In this framework, mention should be
made of a less orthodox way of mterverung in the
mternal affairs of another soverelgn state u'hrch
consists of providing shelter or even more acttve
support for rebellious movemcnts rn that state
u'ith the objective of harassing or even toppling
an unfriendly govemment or regime. This prac-
tice now appears to be more prevalent in sub-
Saharan Africa.
126. Mrlrtary intcrventton rn the internal affairs
ofa sovereign state by'foretgn states or even by a
international coalition under IIN auspices, with-
out the consent of the government of that state, is
still considered to be an infringement of inter-
national law.
lZ7 . It is customary for rnterventions of this
sort to take place with the agreement of the
government and on the basis of a UN mandate m
order to enable humanitarian aid to be distrib-
uted, to help implement an exrsting pcace agree-
ment through peacekeeping or peace-enforcing
operations or 
- 
more rarely, but as was the case
m Kuu'ait 
- 
to remove an aggressor and restore
peace.
128 As stated earlier in the present report, the
UN mandated the intervention of a multinational
force in Somalia rvithout government consent
because of the total drsrntegration of the central
authority Thrs lvas a notable exception to usual
practice In the event of a cnsis or conflict, the
Unrted Nations regronal or sub-regional organ-
isations or states wrll primarill'make every effort
to brokcr a ceasefire, to be follou'ed by' a peace
agreement.
129. The organisation of electtons, wtth the aim
of establishing a democratic government, econ-
omrc reform and respect for human rights, nonn-
ally'forms part of such peace agreements.
130. Thrs means that the interests of
internatronal security' are defined m terms of
ethnocentric Western notions whrch are not
necessarrlv shared by' all sections of the inter-
national commuruty As a consequence, the
operations of multrnational tnterventton forces in
certain parts of the world can easily become
prone to stagnation or fatlure, as was the case in
Somalia, Haiti and Angola. Peace agreements
which have bcen accepted by the parties involved
are only rmplemented partially and only the pres-
ence of foreign troops can prevent a new out-
break of hostilities. Foreign intervention is toler-
atcd, but the ultimate objective of establishing
democracy and propagating respect for human
rights remains a dead letter.
131. Admittedly, in a conceptual framework for
peace and security encompassing the entire inter-
national communttv, there should be room for
different opinions and practices as regards the
most appropriate form of government.
132. Nou'ada1's, public calls for intervention
are mostly the result of suggestive media cov-
erage of confltcts rn the world which almost
automatrcally cause human disaster. European
governments are used to expressing concern
about the situation, calling upon the partres to
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stop fighting and trying to find a peaceful u'ay of
setthng their differences Next, thel'tend to turn
to the United States to see what rnrtiatives it
might take.
133. On the other hand, there is empirrcal
evidence that democratrc institutrons help to
constrain the power of political elites, thereby
decreasing the chances ofgenocide and war. In a
large number of states, holever, political elites
cling to po\\-er in order to exercise unfettered
control over the state and its economy. Ob-
viousl1,, these states emphasise their sovereignty,
whrle opposrng forergn intervention and chal-
lenging the concept of universal human rights.
134. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there
is no early settlement in srght to the debate over
the right to intervene if the objectrves of inter-
vention, apart from bringing peace, are domi-
nated by such controversial concepts as universal
human rights, state sovereignty, democratic re-
form and free market economies.
135. It has now become clear that in the present
post-cold war situation, the United States has
absolved itself of all global responsibility' not
directly related to Amencan securitv and natronal
interests. As a consequence, there may, be sit-
uations where the United States will no longer
feel inchned to take the imtrative and where other
states will have to take the lead in initiatives or
operatrons rn which the United States wrll not
partrcrpate.
136. If Europe wishes or has no other chorce
but to take a higher profile in some areas of the
world where its own security and vital mterests
are at stake, it will have to be prepared to take
initiatives which may' also result in the dep-
loy,rnent of a military intervention force.
137. Although imtiatives to help solve conflicts
or manage crises can only'be taken on a case-by-
case basis, both the EU and WEU will have to be
prepared for rapid action in thrs field Havrng
the possrbrlrty to deploy militarl' forces raprdly
implies that forces should be readily available.
138. The manl'problems encountered in assem-
bhng a multinational intervention force, which
were again apparent in the attempt that ultrm-
ately farled to send such a force to Zaire at the
end of 1996, have led to several proposals
139 Some of these have concentrated on the
possibility of establishing a perrnanent UN rapid
reaction force which could play a role m conflrct
prevention or intervene in order to prevent an
open conflict from detenoratrng This force
should be able to perform both peacekeeprng and
peacemaking operations. An additional advan-
tage would be that rt might dissuade certain
states from intervening on their own behalf.
140 No doubt such a force would have serious
limrtatrons as regards its size and capabilities.
As a consequence. it could only be deployed for a
limrted perrod and would have to rely on the air
and sea-hft capabrlrtres of member states.
l4l. The Netherlands has proposed that a
permanent UN force should be the size of a light
infantry brigade and be composed of volunteers
paid by the Unrted Nations, rvith a status srmilar
to rts civihan staff.
142. Denmark has proposed a different arrange-
ment, offering a headquarters to lvhich states
wrth existing experience in peacekeeping could
assign specrfic units, the idea being that together
thel'could constitute a rapid reaction brrgade for
peacekeeping operations. Such umts could per-
form jornt trarrung and exercrses and be avarlable
at short notice, but only' for operations coming
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which
refcrs to the "pacrfic settlement of disputes".
I43. According to a Canadran proposal, a small
internatronal force headquarters at the seat ofthe
United Natrons in New York, under the authonty
of the Secretary-General, should be charged wrth
contingency planning and initial operational plan-
rung All member states u,ould have the option
of committing unts to thrs force Logicalh', the
deployrnent of such a force rvould be sublect to a
decision of the Secunt_v Councrl and to prror
agreement of allthe contnbuting states.
V. United Nations peacekeeping operaions
in Africa
144. At the end of the cold war when a
multitude of crises in Africa emerged, justrfl,ing
the mtervention of the international communrty,, rt
became the preferred operations area for the UN.
The Unrted States and the ex-Soviet Union had
u'ithdraun from the internal conflrcts u,hich they
had sometimes nurtured over a period of many
years in order to prevent any extension of ther
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adversary's sphere of influence and left it to the
United Natrons to manage these conflicts.
145. Srnce the early vears of rts existence, the
United Nations has carned out operations on the
African continent. usrng the different possibrlities
offered by its Charter.
146 The Suez crisis in 1956 was thc first
occasion on whrch a United Nations rapid action
force rvas deployed to maintain the ceasefire
betrveen the Israehs and the Egyptrans. It was
the first UN interposition force of blue berets,
deployed under the possibilities ofEered by
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
147. This force respected the sovereignty ofthe
states and abstarned from any interference in the
internal affarrs ofthe trvo countries concerned. It
was deployed after the conclusion of a ceasefire
agreement and u,as only allowed to use force for
the purposes of legrtrmate defence.
148 In 1960, rn the Congo, the UN intervened
in an internal conflrct usrng military force for the
first time after a secession attempt by the prov-
ince of Katanga. Thrs type of intervention r,r'as in
fact based on Chapter VII of the IIN Charter and
its oblectrvc rvas to enforce a solution on the par-
ties to a conflrct.
149. A neu' development took place when the
United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(LINTAG), the peacekeeping force for Namibia,
was created in 1989. Thrs force oversaw the de-
colonisatron of the last white colony in Africa.
LINTAG rvas tasked rvith supervrsrng the holding
of free elections rvith a view to the election of a
constrtuent Assembly'. In fact, it supervised the
enrolment of voters, the material organisation of
the elections and the formation of political
partics It even partrcipated in campaigns for
civil educatron and information for voters.
150. In earher operations and missions, the UN
used to settle disputes between states in
accordance rvrth the rules of internatronal law,
dedicated to the pnnciple of s|ate sovereignty and
non-interference in their internal affairs. It did
not have anv legal instruments at its disposal to
settle internal conflicts or to prejudge the res-
ponsibility of an1, one party. This did not cause
an1' real problems, as long as the basrc principles
of peacekeepmg were not called into questron.
151. In Somalia, how-ever, the UN was facing
an open civrl war and it could no longer apply the
old rules. For the first trme in its history, the
Unrted Natrons took the inrtrative to deplol' an
intervention force u'rthout the agreement of thc
partres In December 1992, the Securitl, Council
unanrmously adopted a resolution authorising the
deployment, on the basis of Chapter VII, of an
international coalitron to re-establish order in
Somaha. Here. for the first time, the UN put into
practrce the "right of humanitarian interference",
because, through an extensive interpretation of
Article 39 of the LN Charter, the Security
Council had authorrsed the deplol.rnent of the
US-led multinational Unified Task Force
(LJNITAF) rvith a humanitarian oblective without
the agreement of the uarring partles
152. It should be said. however. that UNITAF
u'as not a great success because the operation's
preclse alms were not clear and there was
drsagreement betrveen the US Government and
the I-iN Sccretan'-General over whether thc
troops' role was to includc disarming hostile
factions and pacrflrng the countrl' or merely
securmg the florv of ard.
153. In May 1993, TINITAF was replaced by
the LN Operatron in Somalia (I-INOSOM II)
consrstmg of some 20 000 troops rvhich were to
provrde assistance urth enforcing the March
1993 ceasefire and the formation of a transitional
national council. I-INOSOM II rvas new in that
rts troops were authonsed to use force in
implementing therr mandate, in particular when
disarmrng fighters and preserving security
conditions.
154. Very soon. LINOSOM II also ended in
failure because the Unrted Nations was unable to
run an operation of this srze. The dual mandate
was not implemented. One part of it with regard
to thc disarmrng of fighters, the preservation of
secuntv condrtrons and the opening of roads
needed for the transport of humanitarian aid
came under Chapter VII, and the other part
regardrng the political and admrnistrative
reconstructron of Somalia came under Chapter
u
155. It became clear that the conduct of peace-
enforcement operations under Chapter VII
required means and organisatronal structures far
beyond the capacities of the lIN. It was also
noted that the use of force called into question the
principles of neutrality and impartiality which




156. After the failure of TINOSOM II, the UN
Secretary'-General declared that a peacekeeping
operatron u'ould have to be halted:





did not demonstrate pol-
itical rvill, because peace could not be
imposed,
if the troops put at the UN's disposal
drd not accept the drscipline of a multi-
lateral operation;
- 
if the member states were no longer
prepared to enforce the peace, which
implied the deployment of heavy arms
and the risk of loss of human lives
157. There are many more lessons to be learned
from this operation, as Winrrch Kiihne showed in
a recent Chaillot Paper3. The following are some
examples
- 
the use of force in peacekeeping is a
dehcate and ambivalent matter. Some-
trmes it can help stabrlise a peace pro-
cess, but m other instances it can dam-
age the peace process;
- 
m general, the use of force cannot be a
substitute for patience and dialogue. It
can be useful in protecting people, for
delivering humanrtarian aid or main-
tammg a stable environment, but it can
only resolve societal conflicts under ex-
ceptronal circumstances,
- 
although in their political rhetoric, most
Western countries emphasise the
importance of respectrng human and
minorrty nghts, it appears that in
practice therr governments and popul-
ations are not prepared to take the risk
of serious loss of life in operations to
protect these rights if there are no vital
natronal rnterests at stake.
158. In Chapter ll (c) of this report, mention
was made of the events which led to the
t For a detailed discussion of recent peacekeeping
operatlons rn Africa, see Winrich Kiihne, Lessons
from peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozam-
bique, Somalia, Rrvanda and Liberia in "WEU's role
in crisis management and conJlict resolution in sub-
Saharan Africa", Chaillot Paper 22, WEU Instrtute
for Secuntv Studies, Paris, 1995.
deplolment of the UN Assrstance Mission for
Rrvanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993, which was
supposed to help implement the Arusha Peace
Agreement betw'een the government of Rwanda
and the Rwandan Patrrotic Front. UNAMIR was
only deployed at full strength in late March
1994, a ferv da1's before the mass killings of
Tutsrs started. It was not suffrciently equipped
and the specralised civilian staffs needed for a
successful operatron were not deployed. The
Commander of LINAMIR, General Romeo
Dallaire, later said that he could have stopped the
genocide from spreading by deploying his
existing contingent if he had received additional
appropnate equipment and an enhanced man-
datea. Holl'ever, rvith fresh memories of the
UNOSOM II failure in mind, no Western state,
rvith the exception of France, was ready to
change UNAMIR's mandate or send in ad-
ditronal troops
159. Later, in June 1994, France sent 2500
troops to Ru'anda in Operatron Turquoise under
a UN Security Council resolution in order to
protect crvilians and ensure the distribution of
food aid At an earlier stage, Belgium, France
and Italy had evacuated foreign nationals rvith
logistic support from the Unrted States.
160. All the abovementroned operations in
Rwanda perfectly match WEU's Petersberg
tasks. lf operations conducted by WEU member
states had taken place under WEU authority,
they rvould certainly have appeared less partial
and more acceptable.
161. At the request of Italy and France, thc
Permanent Council of WEU met on 17 and 2l
June 1994, but it decided that WEU's support
should consrst solelf in coordinating contn-
butions from rndivrdual member countries for
humarutanan rehef in Ru'anda. The WEU Plan-
ning Cell was rnstructed to serve as a point of
contact to provide the coordination. In plain
Ianguage, this decision was nonsense.
162. A Belgian parliamentary fact-finding
committee, tasked rvith investigating the events
leading to the assassination of Belgian para-
troopers of the UN forces in Rwanda (Minuar)
on 7 Apnl 1994, denounced the passive attitude
26
o Chaillot Paper 22, page 33
DOCUMENT 1566
of Western govemments u,hich did nothing to
prevent the genocide in Rvvanda rn spring 1994
163. The committee found evidence that. in
January' 1994, the Commander of the Belgian
Mrnuar forces had been informed of aggressions
being prepared against these forces and plans to
organise the massacrc of Tutsis. When the gov-
ernments of Belgrum, France and the United
States were informed about this, they instructed
their diplomats to veri$, this informalon and
accepted the rndrgnant denials of President
Haby'arimana of Rlvanda5. Nothing was done to
prevent the predrcted genocide.
164. Recent events rn both Rwanda and Zare
have demonstrated how the fear of repeating the
failure in Somalia has resulted in Western states
showing reluctance when it comes to UN peace-
eeping or humanitarian operatlons on African
soil.
W. African regional cooperation in the
prevention and management of conflicts
165. Afrrcan natrons have tended to opt for less
binding treaties, devoid of any serious
commitment or concrete obligatron tou,ard
partrcipant states. Through this lack of collective
commitment and absence of a strategrc vision of
the future, regronal conflict resolution on the
Afrrcan continent has not been very successful.
Organisations u'hose pnmary purpose is to foster
economic and political cooperation tend to
achieve more success in the development of
peace and stabilitl' Linking cconomic and mili-
tary security facilrtates the peacemaking process.
166. The OAU (Organisation of African Unity)
has a bad track record of condoning regronal
conflrct on the pretext of internal state secunty.
The OAU does not have effective means for the
preventron and resolution of conflicts. In 198 l, rt
adopted the Banjul Charter (the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights) which entcred
into force in October 1986. Its purpose was to
define human rights in terms of individual
freedoms and social responsibilitres, but rt left
the interpretatron and apportiomng of those rights
to national governments which negated their
universality Srnce 1987, comphance with the
Charter by signatory states has been supervised
by the Afncan Commrssion on Human and
Peoples' fughts, which has no means of enforce-
ment.
167 In June 1992, the OAU put fonvard a ne\\'
conflict resolution mandate. "Proposals for an
OAU Mechanism for Conflict Preventron and
Resolution". These proposals also embodied the
creation of a coordinating body based upon the
fJN model, which rvould enable the OAU to take
rnitratives to anticipate and contain potentially
dangerous situatrons as well as provide for poli-
tical and mrlitary organs for peacemakrng. The
proposals were thought to have the advantage of
employing indigenous peacekeepers rvho might
have an ability to relate to the problem at hand.
168. After having sponsored a ceasefire and an
agreement betu'een the Rwandan Government
and the FPR with regard to the establishment of a
transitional govemment, the OAU deploved a
Neutral Mrlrtary Observer Group (NMOG),
composed of 50 observers from OAU member
states, rvhich from July 1992 monitored the
ceasefire In 1993. NMOG was replaced by
NMOG II, composed of 130 observers, which in
November 1993 rvas integrated rn the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rrvanda
(rrNAMrR)
169. In Article XIX of the OAU Charter of 25
May 1963, member states pledged to settle all
disputes among themselves b1' peaceful means
and to this end thev decided to establish a
Commission of Mediation, Concrliation and Ar-
brtration. The specifics of this Commission were
defined in a protocol signed on 21 July 1964, but
it was never put into practice, among other things
because it referred to disputes among member
states. Since 1963, conflrcts and u'ars in Africa
have almost without exceptron taken place wrthm
and not between states and the Commission of
Medration. which was regarded as a hierarchrcal
and ineffective structure, never became oper-
ational.
170. In July 1992, the OAU agreed to
Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim's
"Proposal for resolving conflrcts in Africa" and
its Cairo summit meeting of June 1993 created
the "African mecharusm apparatus for pre-
venting, managing and resolving Afrrcan crises".
At this summit meeting, the OAU reaffirmed that
it accepted the borders inherited from colonial-
lsm. It considered the prevention of conflictss Le lvlonde, 6 March 1997
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through observatron and morutoring misstons as
its primary objective. The Burcau of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government
rvas desrgnated to be the decision-making central
organ of the mechanrsm, rvith the Secretary-
General as its operatronal arm.
17 | In order to become more effecttve, the
Central Organ decrded to establish a strategtc
alert svstem for monrtonng conflict sttuattons.
rvhich is nor,r' the fundamental aspect of thc
OAU's preventrve diplomacy. Its task is to anti-
cipate geopolitically sensrtrve situations wrthin
and between states that mrght degenerate into
open conflict.
172. At the operational level, the Central Organ
considers that development of rts decisron-
making powers and coordinatron rvith the United
Nations and sub-regronal organisations would
contribute to its capabrlity for timely' and effi-
crent intervention should the need anse.
173. A differcnt, subregional inrtiatrve was
taken u'hen the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Protocol
on Non-Aggression in April 1978, rvhich
required rts member states to come to one
another's assistance in the event of aggression
In order to help put an end to a devastating civil
lvar in Lrberia, the Standing Medratron Com-
mittee estabhshed a Military Observer Group
(ECOMOG) and brokered a peace plan, called
the Yamoussaouhro IV Accord, followed later b1'
many more peace accords ECOMOG, which
rvas to supervise the rmplementation of the peacc
agreement, has been accompanied since
September 1993 b1' a UN Observer Mission in
Liberia (LINOMIL) ECOMOG's operation was
certainly not an unqualified succcss, not least
because it was dominated by the Nigerian mili-
tary dictatorshrp whrch was suspected of havrng
its own specific agenda for the operation.
174. Another initrative r,r'hich would appear
worth mentioning comes from the Permanent
Consultative Committee of the United Nations
for Security Questions in Central Afnca, estab-
lished in 1991, rvhrch brings together repres-
entatives from I I French- or Portuguese-speak-
ing countries in Central Africa (Angola, Burundr,
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea,
the Central Afrrcan Republic, Rrvanda, Sao
Tomd and Princtpe, Chad and Zaire). In 1992
thrs Committee adopted a programme of work
u'rth the following oblectrves:
establishment of an earll' rvarning
sy,stem to monrtor peace and security
initiatives on a contrnuous basis, collect
rnformation on potential or developing
crisrs srtuatrons and to elaborate cnsrs-
management strategies :
- 
establishment of a sub-regional
conventronal arms register 
- 
in accor-
dance u'ith the sprrrt and the principles
of the United Nations register - in
order to create a climate of confidence
among states;
- 
drarving up a "mrcro-disarmament"
programme through coopcration to pre-
vent random proliferation and illegal
transfers of light weapons and to
encourage demobrlisation of irregular
forces and their reintegratton mto
socrety;
- 
drafting a non-aggression pact (based
on the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-
Aggression in West Africa) u'htch rvas
signed in Yaounde during the 32nd
summrt of the OAU in Jull' 1996.
rmmediate creation of multrfunctional
unrts in the armed forces of member
states that could be cmployed for hum-
anitarian operations, peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement and capable of raprd
or even preventive deployment.
175. Financrally', over and above contributions
from member states, the Permanent Consultatrve
Commrttee of the United Nations is able to drar.r'
on a specral fund created by the IIN General
Assembly in December 1995 (Resolutron
50/7lB) and resourced by voluntary contri-
butions from member states and international
organrsatrons.
176 African states and African multilateral
organisations have made several efforts to find a
viable solution to the present conflict in the Great
Lakes region A first summit meeting, attended
by many heads of state and government of sub-
Saharan Afrrcan states, took place on 5
November 1996 in Nairobi, without the partrci-
pation of Zaire. This summit meetmg concluded
wrthout any results. On 3 December 1996, a
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summit meeting rvas held in Brazzaille, Congo,
with Zarre and Burundi participating, but in the
absence of Uganda and Rwanda. On 15 Dec-
ember 1996, a conferencc took place m Narrobi,
Kenva, organised by Daniel Arap Mor, the
Presrdent of Kenya, attended b1' thc South
Afrrcan President. Nelson Mandela, and other
heads of state and government. Zaire's Prime
Minister, Kengo wa Dondo, did not partrcrpate.
177. The OAU devoted several meetmgs to the
conflrct in the Great Lakes region and on 26
March 1997 it held an extraordmary summit
meeting in Zaire. On the fringe of this confer-
ence, talks rvere held between representatives of
President Mobutu and the rebels In January
1997, after rnitial hesitations about becoming
excessrvell' mvolved, President Mandela of South
Africa started making serrous efficrts to bring
both parties to the conflict rn Zate to the neg-
otiating table and, on 5 Aprrl 1997, peace talks
started in Cape Town.
WI. Initiatives to establish multinational
African forces
178 In recent years, economic disaster,
political unrest and instability have caused manl'
rebellions and a number of conflrcts including
manv internal armed conflicts and civil wars.
Such rebelhons and armed conflrcts have pro-
voked interventrons by individual foreign states,
subregional orgarusations and UN peacekeeping
operations.
179. The mcreasing reluctance of non-African
states to have their troops involved in military
operations rn Afnca has led to various initiatives
to examine the possibilities for establishing
multinational African forces rvhich could play,a
role in peacekeeping operations on the African
contment. Both France and the United States
have taken specific initiatives while WEU has
also been actrve in thrs field since 1995.
(a) France's initiatives
180. At the Franco-African summit meeting in
Brarrrtz in November 1994, France proposed the
creation of a multrnatronal African force with
logistical support to be provided by France. The
African states at the conference gave only a
lukervarm response and there was no follow-up
to France's inrtiative.
181. On the frrnge of the lfth Franco-African
conference, which took place in Ouagadougou,
Burkma, on 4-6 December 1996, African leaders
again bricfly discusscd plans to jointll' train
military units from varlous African countries to
form a provrsional force which could go rnto
actron rapidly on orders from the United Natrons
or the Organisation of Afncan Unilv Until now,
however, there has been no follorv-up to these
rnformal discussions.
182 In preparation for the OAU summit
meeting in Lome on 26 March 1997, the
President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema.
proposed the creation of a pan-Afrrcan force of
3000 troops, based on the concept of standbv
mrlitary uruts, with national units of a maximum
of 450 troops for peacekeeping or peacemaking.
The lack of political will and financial means
continue to be the obstacles preventing such a
force from being established6 Although lrttle
progress has been made urthin this wider insti-
tutronal framework, France has made headrvay
on a smaller scale and at a practical level.
183. France 
- 
rt wrll be remembered 
- 
sent
troops to the Central Afncan Republic in order to
help restore order after a rebelhon started against
President Ange-Felix Patussi in December 1996
184. In accordance rvith the Bangui agreements
of 25 January 1997, four African statcs (Chad,
Gabon, Mali and Burkina Faso) have provided a
peace force whrch will control the imple-
mentation of these agreements, particrpate rn the
disarmament of the mutineers and ensure securitl'
in Bangur Senegal and Togo have provided ad-
ditional units.
185. The multinational force, called MISAB,
consists of about 450 troops, has a mandate of
three months which is renewable, and reccives
logistic support from France. France noted that
this is the first inter-African peace force 
-
independent, francophone and logistically sup-
ported by France 
- 
to assrst an African country
under a diplomatic mandate from other African
countries. It considers this as a basis for a
multilateral peace force in Africa, organised by
Afncan general staffs7.
u Ln Frgoro, 17 March 1997.
' Le lvlonde, 15 February 1997
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(b) The United States' initiative
186. During hrs visit to Africa in September
1996. the then US Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher, proposed the creation of a l0 000-
strong militarl' force composed of units from
vanous African armed forces, which could be
used as an intervention force. The main task of
this force would be to protect civilians in crvrl
wars in Africa, among other things by creatrng
safe havens. It was noted that such a force could
be used for missions lyng half-way betwcen
peacekeeping operations 
- 
whrch in principle can
only take place after the conclusion of a peace
agreement or a ceasefire 
- 
and a foreign invasron
to take full control of a country. On the other
hand, it has to be recognrsed that such a rel-
atively modest African force wrll not be the
panacea to large-scale violence Controlling con-
flrcts such as m Somalia or Rwanda u'ould
require a bigger intervention force
187. Accordrng to this proposal, the United
States, and possibly, other foreign po\\'ers, rvould
trarn. equip and, rf requrred, help this African
forcc deploy m theatres of conflrct. In partrcular
France and South Africa reacted negatrvely to
thrs US proposal.
I88. On the occasron of the WEU Assembly
Presrdentral Commrttee's uslt to LIN head-
quarters on 10-12 December 1996, Mr Lansana
Koul'ate, Deputy Secretary-General, Department
of Polrtrcal Affairs, declared that the African
force for possible peacekeeping actron in Africa,
as proposed b1'the former US Foreign Secretary,
Warren Christopher, u'ould be contrary, to tIN
principles.
189. Mr Koul,ate said that priority should be
given to development of the economy and of
democratic govemment u'hile curbing arms pro-
liferation
(c) WEU initiatives
190. In the document on "European secunty, a
comrnon concept of the 27 WEU countnes",
adopted by the WEU Councrl at its meeting of 14
November 1995 rn Madrid, it u'as said that WEU
rvas in the process of studving the possibilrty' of
supportrng initiatives taken by the Africans rn the
field of peacckeeprng, notably, vra regional and
sub-regional institutions.
l9l. Meetrng in Lrsbon in May 1995, the
Council instructed the Permanent Council "to
take forward rts reflections on peacekeeprng and
conflict prevention in Afrrca", in line u'ith the
EU's request to WEU to drarv up and implement
specrfic measures rvhich could help mobrhse
Afrrcan capabrlities rn UN forces.
192. In Birmingham on 7 Ma1' 1996, the
Ministers endorsed the Permanent Councrl's
decision to send a fact-finding mission to Afrrca
193. In the same month, Belgrum declared that,
on the basis of its expenence in Somalia and
Rrvanda during its presidency of WEU in the
second half of 1996, it lvas planning to develop
relatrons between WEU and the OAU in the
context of peacekeeping operations which the
latter carried out in Africa.
194 In August 1996, a WEU fact-finding
missron including staff offrcers from the Planning
Cell visited the seat of the Organrsation of Afri-
can Unity' (OAU), Ethropia, Keny'a, Tanzania,
and Malarvi.
195. The Permanent Council later decided to
invite the Secretary-General of the OAU to vrsit
WEU in Brussels in order to mform the OAU
about WEU's cnsis-management procedures,
drar.r' attention to common ficlds of interest and
specific coopcration possrbilrtres and discuss the
complementarl' roles of the EU and WEU in
conflict prevcntron and peacekeeping in Africa.
It was thought that the discussion could also
focus on ways of improvrng the existing
capabilities of the OAU, sub-regional African
organisations and Afncan countnes that might
contribute troops for peacekecping and of
establishing better contacts betwecn WEU and
the OAU. To date, no such visrt has 1'et taken
place but WEU is continuing to explore pos-
sibilrties for cooperatron rvith the OAU.
196. In that framevvork, the Permanent Council
consrdcred the possibility of maintaining contacts
rvith the appropriate technical rvorking groups of
the OAU through the WEU Politico-Military
Group.
197. The 28 WEU countries rvere invited to
examrne rvay's in rvhich the1. might support the
OAU, sub-regronal organisations or African
countnes in the framework of peacekeeping usrng
various means, such as:
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puttmg equipment for communications
or logrstical support at the OAU's dis-
posal;
making a contribution to the formation
and training of troops in Afrrca or
Europe
198 The Politico-Military Group recommended
the Council to give WEU a cleanng-house role,
to be assumed by the Plannrng Cell. The
Planning Cell should in particular be a point of
contact for the training needs of the OAU, sub-
regional Afrrcan organisations or African
countries. It should identifr regional training
centres and keep a record of an1, support needs
they may have.
199. The Planning Cell could also be the point
of contact for the material needs of the OAU,
sub-regional African organisations or African
countries. Acting upon decisions taken b1' the
Mrnrsterial Councrl at Ostend in November
1996, the Planning Cell has now established
databases for offers of training from European
natrons to Afncan countries.
200. As noted earlier in the present report, in
November 1996 WEU was prepared to meet the
EU's request that it contribute with militarl'
means and expertise to the implementatron of EU
initiatives in the crisis in Zaire.
201. In preparation for further possible
EUAMEU activitres in this connectron, several
initiatives were taken.
202. At the proposal of the EU "African"
working group, the Belgran Presidency of WEU
made a contnbution to the drscussion at the min-
isterial meetmg betrveen the EU and the South
Afrrcan Development Communitl, (SADC) at
Windhoek on 14 and l5 October 1996.
203 The WEU Politico-Military Group has
also proposed that WEU establish contacts with
the OAU organs charged with peacekeeping, and
wrth the Intergovernmental Committec for Def-
ence and Security (ICDS) of the SADC in order
to intensifr cooperation.
204 One u'onders why so many initiatives and
efforts did not lead to any tangiblc action, while
the crisis in the Great Lakes region lingered on,
entarling an appalling humanitanan disaster for
hundreds of thousands of refugces?
205. To ansrver this questron, it may be best to
refer to what the Belgian Defence Minister, Jean-
Pol Poncelet, said when, representing the
Presidency of WEU, he addressed the WEU
Assembly in December 1996. Mr Poncelet
recalled that rn Ostend, WEU had confirmed that
it was prepared to respond to the requests of the
European Unron rn the field of peacekeeping in
Africa and that it was in a position to offer rts
availability' to contribute to the UN operation
Hc regretted that indecision on the part of the
international community had not provrded WEU
with the opporrunity, to act upon this readiness.
He ventured that "the effectiveness of WEU is
hostage to the political will of each of its mem-
bers. The lack of common vision and solid-antv
threatens it with paralysis".
(d) An EU-ACP initiative?
206. At its March 1997 plenary session, the
loint EU-ACP Assembly' asked the European
Council to examine the possibility' of creatrng, rn
cooperation with WEU, a European corps m-
cluding civilian and military units, charged with
implementing peacekeeprng and peace-enforce-
ment operations and creating a European civilian
corps, in particular to reinforce humarutarian
actlon.
207 In vierv of the considerable reluctance
shorm b1' European countries to deploy therr
mrlrtary forces m Afnca, the rdea of creating a
mixed civilian and military colps for peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement seems far too
ambitiouss.
WII. France's military presence in
sub-Saharan Africa
208. At the time of Africa's decolonisation,
France, which did not share the superpou'ers'
bipolar world view, developed its own policres
for marntaining its relations with sub-Saharan
Africa and its influence rn the region Its mam
objective was to marntain peace and stability
with a view to protecting its economic and
polrtrcal interests. Between 1960 and 1979,
France signed defence agreements with erght
Central Afrrcan states, which included a non-
automatic French guarantee in the event of
aggression. These agreements allow African
3l






to call on French forces
to help re-establish their internal or external
defences and are accompanied b1' specral agree-
ments for maintammg order In exchange,
France is entrtled to statron troops and equipment
and the necessar)' mfrastructure m those states.
209 Through military assistance agreements,
France provides general logistical support and
equipmcnt, forces' training bv providing officers
for mrlrtary academies and training in France,
advice and assistance, marntenance and specific
logistical support ln cnsls srtuations.
210. In the recent past, France has been
mvolved in three drfferent forms of intervention
for the purpose of
restormg the internal srtuation within a
country' (e g. Cameroon, from 1957 to
1e63),
stopprng subversrve wars supported
from outside (e g the Shaba u'ars in
Zaire in 1977 and 1978);
- 
protectmg a state against a foreign ag-
gressor (e g the war betu'een Chad and
Libya)
2ll. Intervention b1' France has alu'a1's been
based on a call for hclp from the government
under attack In such cases. the French Govern-
ment has tended to refer prrmarilv to the need for
a stronger French presence in order to protcct
soldiers and infrastructure, French citizens and
other foreign residents and organrse their evac-
uation if necessan'. and onlv secondarilv to the
call for help from a frrendly' natron associated
rvrth France through defence agrecments
212. The reason rvhl' France has placed so
much emphasis on the relationshrp wrth African
armed forces is that specrfic circumstances have
lcd it to believe that mrlrtary mstrtutrons are often
the sole anchor for states m rvhrch the political
situatron is highly volatrlc
213 The early 1990s. and the nerv call for
democratisation, fundamentally, changed the
naturc of the threat States not prepared to
manage the nerv political reality were faced rvith
sudden outbursts of vrolence rvithm therr territory
and found that their securrty and defence pohcies
provided no answer.
214. Thc rrsk of interstate clashes is very lorv
srnce, at prcsent. most African armed forces do
not have the capabilrtl,to wage an organised war
or conduct proper battlcs.
215. In its 1994 Defence White Paper, France
proposed a redefinrtion of rts policy on military
rntervention under brlateral defence agreements.
The marn purpose of such interventron u,ould be
the "re-establishment of the territorial integrrtv of
a frrendly country, interpositron in order to termr-
nate a conflict, protection of local populatrons
and retum to civilian order"
216. Theoretrcallr', thrs definrtion no longer
includes mterventron in the internal affairs of a
state m order to protect a particular regime.
217 Nevertheless. recent events rn Central
Afrrca have highhghted some anachronism and
ambrgurty m exrstmg Franco-Afrrcan defence
agreements rvhich, at the time of their conclusion.
\\'ere generalh'based on a "parent-chrld" ftre of
relationship.
218. At present, France has a total of 8 200
troops statroned m a number of French-speaking
African countnes. At the beginning of 1997,











Republic of Central Afnca 2 050 troops
Djibouti 3 500 troops
219 The French Defence Mrnrster, Charles
Millon, recently declared that France may recon-
srder rts military structure in Africa He said that
rvhrle maintaining the same operatronal effic-
icncy, rt rvas possrble to reconsider the bases and
rotatlon arrangements for troops from France. In
future. France also mtends to rell' more an air
transport for rernforcemcnt of its military
presence in Africa if so required and explarned
that Government thrnking centred on trvo aspects:
first, the increasmg number of crises rvrth the
attendant rrsk of African states "rmploding" 
- 
the
most recent examples berng Zarre and Central
Africa 
- 
and the resultrng tension that rvould
threaten other countries and involve France had
obhged the French Govemment to revrerv the
conditions in u'hrch Pans had srgned eight
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defence agreements and no less than 23 milrfiary
cooperation and technical assrstance protocols
during the 1960s and thereafter. Secondlr,, the
plarured reduction of military forces in France,
combmed rvith the move to professional armed
forces, implied more economic restraint in res-
pect of troops that rvould be deployed wherever
neccssary in order to come to the aid of a country
under attacke.
220. It is suggested that apart from Dlibouti,
rvhich will continue to accommodate two
regiments, onlv one regiment wrth operational
and support units rvrll be stationed m each ofthe
other zones in Afnca (Senegal, Ivorv Coast,
Gabon). In Chad and the Central African
Repubhc, combined units detached from various
gamsons in France will be rotated. Any future
changes wrll be decided m consultation with
countries with rvhrch France has defence agree-
ments. On the other hand, this revised presence
bears no relation to the actrvities of the Milrtary
Cooperation Mission (MMC), dependent on the
Mrnrstry for Cooperation, in the 23 African
countnes which have signed mrlrtary cooperation
and assistance agreements ro
221 In the future. France rvill rely more on air
transport to reinforce its militarl' presence in
Africa, if so required France may also become
less eager to intervene in internal conflicts after
its recent experiences in the Central African
Republic and Rwanda.
IX. The rapprochement between France
and the United States on Zaire
222. The crisis in the Great Lakes region has
revealed drfferences between the United States
and France in their pohcy towards sub-Saharan
Afnca. Seen in a historical perspective, these
differences are quite understandable but unfor-
tunately the1, may have hampered an early
solution of the crisrs.
(a) The Uniled States
223. Durrng the cold war, the Unrted States, as
one of the two superpowers in the bipolar world,
was an important player on the African con-
e Le Monde, 6 March 1997.
10 Le Monde, l1 January 1997
tinent. Its lertmotif was to stem lts adversary,'5
progress on that continent
224. After de-Stalinisation, the Soviet Umon
started to promote peaceful coexistence through-
out the u'orld As part of this policy, it provided
polrtrcal and military support to national liber-
ation movements m countries that rvere still col-
onles. at the same time supporting opposrtion
movements in newly independent Afrrcan states
lvith close relations to the Western camp
225 United States policv principallv consisted
of restricting the rnfluence of the Sovret Union
and Gaddafi's Lrby'a. Its strategic interests in
sub-Saharan Africa were mainl1' a consequence
of its exploitation of strategic rarv materials in
central and southern Africa and of rts concern
over possrble Soviet intervention in the regions
where these rvere to be found and rn areas ad-
jacent to the sea lanes used for the transport of
oil from the Middle East.
226. Thrs firmlv embeddcd United States policy'
lost rts ratson d'1tre with the end of the cold rvar
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Wrth
Africa no longer one of the battlefields for the
struggle against communrst mfluence rn the
rvorld, the United States lost part of rts mterest in
the contrnent. On the other hand, a sectron of the
Unrted States foreign policy communrty strll
takes the vieu, that healthy economlc develop-
ment m Africa could prevent African countries
from relying too heavrly on western economies
for survival in the future. It rightly consrders
that a continent of more than 600 million
rnhabrtants cannot be excluded and marginahsed
from the u,orld economy rvithout disastrous
consequences in a more distant future. There rs
an awareness that armed conflicts in Africa are
against Western interests because thel' obstruct
vital economic development and cooperation.
227 . At the sarne time, the United States
sympathrses rvith anv African state that is willing
and able to provide support in the fight against
expansionist Islamic fundamentalism, Uganda,
Ethiopia and Eritrea being recent examples.
228. Most analysts, however, agree that the
Unrted States has no specific overall African
policy and that rt tends to react to events as they
occur, with the prematurely aborted operation in




229 Following thrs disastrous experience, one
Iertmotif has certamly become that it does not
wrsh to get involved in anything that mrght lead
to an armed intervention in Afnca.
230. The warm relations between the United
States and President Mobutu cooled off consid-
erably after the end of the cold rvar. When it
became clear in the early 1990s that Mobutu was
obstructing democratic elections, power-sharing
with other political movements and economrc
reform, the United States tried to isolate Zaire by
denf ing it economic and military ard and reduc-
ing contacts at all levels.
231. On the other hand, it never actively sought
President Mobutu's removal from power,
thinking that he was the onl1, leader who could
prevent the break-up of Zaire rnto drfferent parts.
Splitting the countrv into several states was
thought to be even more disastrous for the region
than the continuing dictatorship of Mobutu Sese
Seho. Meanwhrle, the United States supported
the new leaders of Uganda and Rwanda in
implementurg free market reforms. These rvere
also the leaders rvho actively supported a reb-
ellrous movement in Zaire led by Laurent Kabila.
When the rebellion became increasingly success-
ful in its drive to occupy the whole territory of
Zaire and to remove President Mobutu, it was
said by many'that the rebellion was the result of
the Unrted States' secret agenda in that region. It
is too early to confirm such suspicions. It cannot
be denied, however, that wrth the increasrng
success of the rebellion, the United States has
come to see it as the best chance to remove
President Mobutu. United States policy has
mostly been dnven by events and rt has certainly
not done anJthing to halt the rebellion. Although
Mobutu's departure is novv taken for granted, the
United States is not certain about what rs gomg
to happen next. It considers a more represen-
tative government is the only viable long-term
formula for stability m the country, but it is
aware that rebel leader Laurent Kabila is not
really interested in accountable and democrat-
ically elected government
(b) France
232. France has considered its relations wrth
sub-Saharan Afrrca from a different perspectlve
After decolonisatron, it marntained a very close
relationship with its former colonies, whrch rt
continued to support economically and militarily.
Through this relatronship, u,hrch it also enjoyed
with other French-speakrng African states. it rvas
able to contrnue plal,ing an rmportant role m the
world and the United Nations. Afncan states are
an important element of the French-speaking
rvorld France's hmited but efficient military
mterventrons in friendly sub-Saharan African
states have in most cases been successful,
preserving these states from chaos and disaster.
233. Throughout Presrdent Mobutu's rergn,
France has been among hrs most loyal supporters
for shghtly different reasons from those of the
United States. France considered President
Mobutu as the best possible guarantor of the
unity and territorial integrity' of Zare.
234. France's trade rvith and investment in
Zaire s modest as compared with both Belgium
and the Umted States. It has, however, always
considered Zaire essential to the French presence
on the continent, not least because Zarre is the
world's second-largest French-speakrng country.
235 France is particularly worried about the
consequences of a possible break-up of Zaire for
other countries in the region.
236 Therefore, the French Government has
strongly promoted the idea of an international
conference on the Great Lakes region m order to
try to establish some basrc rules of the road for
acceptable behaviour in relations between states
in the region. Among other things, France takes
the view that states should not support armed
rebellions against other states.
237. In the early' 1990s, France joined other
Western countries ln urgmg President Mobutu to
give up power and when it became clear that
Mobutu obstructed democratrc reform, it lorned
them in freezing rts relations with Zaire In
1994, France resumed some civil development
ard but continued to observe the general cmbargo
on milrtary equrpment and training.
238. After the assassination of Ru'andan Presi-
dent Habyarimana, France's long-standing ally,
and the ousting of lus regime bv rebellious and
allegedly Anglo-Saxon onented Tutsi forces,
France started to worry that other sub-Saharan
African countries with ties with France mrght
interpret thrs as an important srgn that France's




239. As soon as the Tutsi-inspired rebellion in
Eastem Zare under Laurent Kabila started to
take shape wrth potentrally' drsastrous conse-
quences for the predominantly Hutu refugee
population in that area, France started advoc-
ating the dispatch of a multrnational mrlitary
force on a humanitarian mission in order to pro-
tect relief rn'orkers in their humanitarian en-
deavours to assist refugees.
240. In the end, this humanitarian operation
failed to materialise partly because many critrcs
were afraid that a humanitarian force could
develop into an interposition force, protecting the
regime of President Mobutu against the advanc-
rng troops of the rebellion
241. At the begrnning of March 1997, France
made a last attempt to persuade its European
partners to support international intervention rn
Zanre, m partrcular to establish an air corridor to
ferry aid to more than 200 000 refugees who had
fled their camps. Other EU states made rt clear.
however, that they' would not approve any pro-
posal that would involve the sendrng of troops.
United Kingdom officials said that they could not
contemplate "any kind of force being sent unless
there is a ceasefire"ll
242 After the farlure of this new attempt,
France had no choice other than to give up and it
then turned all its attention towards actively
supporting the peace plan drawn up by the
special envoy of the IIN and OAU, which rvas to
be adopted by the Security Council on l9
February 1997 and rvhich among other things en-
visaged an immediate ceasefire.
(c) Cooperation
243. It is no secret that there is deep and long-
standing suspicion between France and the
Unrted States over Africa but in recent weeks
they have gradually' modified their opposrng
views on the conflict n Zaire. France has played
down its call for humanitarian interventron in
Eastern Zaire, whrle the United States now seems
to share the French view that a qurck milrtary
victory by the rebels rvill not solve the problems
in Zaire.
244. At the same time, France has now ac-
cepted the vierv that President Mobutu has no
choice other than to step down and try to cut hrs
losses .
245 At the end of March 1997, France and the
United States launched a joint diplomatic irutra-
tive to push for a ceasefire and for talks between
President Mobutu and the rebels Specific steps
rvere taken to advocate this approach in the
Afncan countries that were to attend the OAU
summit in Lomd, where the organisation's
conflict-prevention body would also meet to
drscuss the crisis inZaire.
246. It makes little sense to try to turn Zaire
into a bone of contention for mfluence in the
region, as has been suggested by contrasting
United States and French opinions in the early
phase of the crisrs. Nerther of these states can
afFord to haggle over influence, prestige and
strategic differences rn this part of the world.
Only cooperation and coordination between the
countrres which can exercise influence wrll help
the entire region to overcome the present crisis.
X. Europe's reaction to the crisis
in Eastern Zaire in lqte 1996
247. At the end of October 1996, international
attention focused on the situation in Eastem
Zaire, where a senous crisis was developrng.
Zaire had started efforts to expel the Banya-
mulenge, a Tutsi commurutl' which had been
living in that part of Zaire since the last centun,,
but u'hich were still denied citrzenship. The gov-
ernment operation had caused a rebellion of the
Banyamulenge u'hich, in combination u'ith reb-
ellious activities of the Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Zare-Congo
(ADFL) was developing into an outright war
with the objective of ousting Presrdent Mobutu
Sese Seko's regime.
248. The advance of the Tutsi Banyamulenge
and the ADFL provoked a huge humanitarian
crisis that threatened the estimated I 000 000
Ru'andan refugees in the Kiw region These
refugees, mainly' Hutu, had been living in Zaire
since 1994, having fled the advance of the mainly
Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front after the genocrde
massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus earlier
that year
249 The remains of the Interahamwe
which had marnly been responsrble
massacres, had taken refuge in Zaire
: mrlitia,
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mixed with other Hutu refugees. They exerted
strong pressure on the refugees to remain m
Zaire, suggesting that they, would be killed or
arrested upon their return to Rwanda With the
advance of the unfriendly Hutu rebellion, many
refugees were thought to be in danger of losing
therr lives through massacre or starvation.
250. On 28 October, the European Union called
for an immediate ceasefire. It sent its special
envoy for that region, Aldo Alello, to Afnca in
order to facilitate the dialogue between Zaire and
Rwanda After a discussion with Emma
Bonnino, the European Commissioner for hum-
anitarian aid, it asked the Commission to make
proposals on humanitarran aid for the refugees in
the Great Lakes region.
251. The EU Councrl also requested the
Committee of Permanent Representatives to
submrt to it, for its meeting at the end of
November or even before, a proposal for loint
action in support of the process of transition to
democracy n Zaire that was to include among
other thrngs the formation of an independent
European electoral unrt rvorking tn close
cooperation with that of the United Nations, a
contrrbutron to the tIN Trust Fund (both
initiatives were imtially to be funded under the
1996 CFSP budget output) and a conditionality
clause under lvhich the Councrl reserved the right
to w'ithdrarv its assrstance at any time if it
considered that the parties and rnstitutrons in
Zaire were not complying urth the obligations
and principles set out in the Agreement on
transition or were not demonstratmg a full
commitment to establishing democracT, nZare.
252. On 4 November, at a Franco-Spanish
summrt meeting, the French President, Mr
Chirac, and the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr
Aznar, declared that their countries \l,ere
prepared to partrcipate in a multinational force to
provide security in the Kivu region. This force, a
decision on whrch had to be taken by the Security
Council, should soon be replaced by an African
force
253. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Erik Derycke, after a meeting with his Rwandan
counterpart, Anastase Gasane, declared that
Belgium was in favour of the creation of safe
humanitarian corridors in order to come to the
assistance of the refugees. Mrlrtary protection,
he sard, should preferably be assured by African
troops.
254 At the beginning of November, France and
Spain, seconded by other countries, formally
tabled a proposal to deploy a 5 00O-strong multi-
national UN-sponsored force. Many countries
and aid organisations were concerned that aid
would be denied to the Interahamwe, who often
terronsed refugees and exercrsed control over aid
supplies in the refugee camps. The Franco-
Spamsh initiative was supported by a number of
Afncan countries including South Africa and by
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
255. On 7 November 1996, an extraordinary
meeting of the Development Aid Ministers of the
European Union took place with the particrpatron
of the Commrssioner for humanitanan aid and
representatives of the United Nations and the
International Red Cross The objectrve of thrs
meetrng was'. "(a) to exchange mformatron on the
"serious situation" on the ground; (b) to reach a
consensus in the EU and its member states on the
"operational humanitarian response" to make in
view of the crisis; (c) to see how to ensure that
humanrtarian actions rvere conducted effectively
and in a coordinated manner"
256. Again, no decisrve actron was taken,
notrvithstanding the useful exchange of infor-
mation between the different organisations
mvolved. In their declaration. the fifteen
ministers:
fi) reaffrrmed the EU's determination and
commrtment to do all in its pou'er to help
and assist the rulnerable people in Eastern
Zaire, in order to prevent an even greater
human tragedy and avoid a potential catas-
trophic humanitarian disaster rn the region;
(rr) reiterated the EU's point of view
according to which these complex ques-
trons may only be resolved by dralogue
and entreated all parties concerned, includ-
ing Rrvanda and Zaire, to begin such a
process as soon as possible;
(uy' expressed their total support for the
eflorts of the IIN and OAU and regional
leaders to this end, confirming the EU's




(rv) backed the appeal made by African
Heads of State in favour of an immediate
cease-fire that should be strrctly respected
m order to allow for an intensification of
diplomatic ef[orts;
(v) shared the views of the African leaders
on the importance of Zaire's territorial
integrity, the end of cross-border incur-
sions and the rnalienable rights of people;
(vi) warmly welcomed the appeal in favour
of the immediate setting-up of safe com-
dors and temporary sanctuaries inside
Zaire, in order to facilitate humanitarian
aid and the repatriation of refugees. The
Fifteen took note, regarding this, of the
request made at the Nairobi Summit of the
Council ofEurope for a "neutral force" to
be deployed;
(vir) whence, noted that special arrange-
ments were urgently required and that
action was being taken by the Security
Council;
(vtrt) strpulated that the French and
Spanish Ministers set out their proposals
aimed at establishing a "temporary force
with strictly humanitarian objectives with
a view to being able to deliver aid to the
populations concerned".
257. Commissioner Emma Bonino once agaln
emphasised that there was a need for better sec-
urity for both the humanrtarian aid rvorkers and
the refugees The Charrman of the meeting said
that the EU was ready to help, but that this could
not be done rf there was no security. Ministers
asked the Security Council to provide the sec-
urity framework for whrch Africa itself was ask-
ing.
258. Mr Ajello said the African countries
wanted a neutral force under LJN command with
a mandate to protect temporary corridors and
safe havens. This did not require a huge force.
259. When the European Uruon Troika and
Commissioner Bonino visited Rwanda and Zaire
on l0 and I I November 1996, they asked the UN
Security Councrl to take an immediate decision to
send a multinatronal force to the Krlu regron of
Eastern Zaire n order to protect humanitarian
convoys.
260. According to the Commission, a consensus
was reached by the European Union, the author-
ities in Rwanda and Zaire and the UN specral
envo)' on the need to deploy a neutral, multr-
national military force in the region. They also
agreed that re-establishing the status quo that
had existed before fighting broke out was not
possible in view of the fact that permanent
refugee camps were considered to be too destab-
ilising and that refugees should be encouraged to
return to their country of ongin.
261. Commissioner Bonmo later declared that
the mandate of a multinational military force
should include the following tasks: deliver food;
protect the refugees, material and humanitanan
aid workers; facilitate voluntary return and dis-
arm the armed refugees. On 14 November 1996,
prior to the definition of a mandate, preparations
started for the dispatch of a multinational
15 000-strong Canadian-led force in pursuance
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
262. The next day,, hundreds of thousands of
refugees started to leave their camps and go back
to Rwanda after the ADFL and other armed uruts
attacked the Interahamwe ln the Mugunga ref-
ugee camp.
263. Although there rvas great uncertainty over
the number and whereabouts of refugees still
wandering around in Eastern Zaire, the return of
the malorrty' of refugees led to hesitation over the
need to send a multinational force. While France
remained msistent, the Unrted States withdrew its
commitment to send ground troops and South
Africa and the central African countries no
longer saw the need for a military force.
264. Despite these less than encouraging
developments, on 16 November the UN Security
Councrl adopted Resolution 1080 rncludrng a
mandate for the multinational force to be sent to
Zaire on a humanitarian missron.
265. On 19 November 1996, the WEU Council
of Minrsters met in Ostend under the Belgian
Presidency. The WEU Council issued a special
declaration on the situation in the Great Lakes
region.
266. In that declaration, it emphasrsed the need
to find a solution to the humanitarian crisis:
"Mirusters expressed their deep concern at
the continuing humanitarian crrsrs in the
Great Lakes region. They reaffrrmed therr
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determinatron fully' to contnbute to the
international eflorts to allevrate the im-
mediate sufferings of displaced persons,
refugees and civilians in Zaire and
Rwanda and to promote their voluntary,
secure and orderly repatrration. Thel,con-
sidered that the massive return of hundreds
of thousands of refugees dunng the recent
days may open the wa1' to the necessary
long-term solution ofthe deeper causes of
the present crisis".
267. Followrng the earher declarations by the
European Union:
"Ministers stressed the urgent need for an
intemational conference on peace, security
and stabilit), in the Great Lakes region
under the auspices of the United Natrons
and for the OAU to address the problems
of the region in a comprehensrve way".
268. Ministers further made rt clear that in their
view the return of refugees to their country of
origin was one of the keys to a solution of the
crisis in the region. Therefore, they'
"called on the Government of Rwanda
fullt' to seize the opportunity to restore
confidence and contribute to a political
solution by facrlrtating the return of the
refugees and securing therr resettlement rn
Rwanda. They hoped that the resettlement
of the refugees rvould take place in an
harmonious atmosphere of national recon-
crhation. Ministers stressed the readiness
of WEU nations to step up their hum-
anitanan aid in order to cover the im-
mediate needs of the returning refugees".
269. According to their declaratron, Mrnisters
still agreed on the need for a multinational force
because they'
"welcomed the adoption of United Natrons
Secuntl' Councrl Resolutions 1078 and
1080 concerning the establishment for
humanitarian reasons of a temporary
multinational force to facilitate the
immediate return of humanitarian organ-
isations and the effectrve delivery by civ-
ilian relief organlsatlons of humanitarian
aid to alleviate the immediate suffering of
drsplaced persons, refugees and civilians at
nsk in Eastern Zaire, and to facilitate the
voluntary', orderl1, repatnatron of refugees
as well as the voluntary return of drsplaced
persons".
270. At their Ostend meeting, Ministers further
drscussed the contribution WEU countrres might
make to implement UN Security Council Resol-
ution 1080 In this respect,
"Mrnisters asked the Permanent Council to
task the relevant WEU bodies 
- 
Planning




study possible assistance by WEU rvith
the dehvery of EU humanitanan ard to
the theatre.
- 
consrder what assistance could be given
to contingents from African nations
which might in due course be deployed
to the reglon, in particular rn the field
of training;
- 
collect and crrculate, with the
assrstance of WEU nations, mform-
ation on their national contnbutions to
the operations,
keep the Council rnformed of the
situation rn the Great Lakes region, on
the basis mter alia of information
provided by WEU nations;
keep under review way,s in whrch WEU
mrght contnbute to the provrsion of
logistic support to the envisaged multi-
national operation, including demining,
medical and engineering support".
27l. Apparently, the meeting had also revealed
some cracks in the member countries' deter-
minatron to become involved in a military
operation, even though rt was solely, for hum-
anitarian purposes, because "finalIy, Ministers
tasked the Permanent Council, in contrnuing to
monitor the situation closely, to examme what
consequences the rapidly changing srtuation on
the ground might have on the options for possible
WEU involvement"
272. In fact, the objective of the Belgian
Presidency was essentially to give WEU a
coordinating role Howevcr, some countries 
- 
in
particular the Unrted Kingdom and the Neth-
erlands 
- 
expressed reservations in this respect,
especially as the refugees had lust started to
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return to Rrvanda rn large numbers and because a
military planning meetrng was to take place in
Stuttgart within a few days with thc countnes
which had promrsed to contribute to the multi-
national mrlitary force. It was decided that an
officer of the WEU Planning Cell would attend
the Stuttgart meeting.
273. After the Ostend meeting, the Belgian
Defence Minister, Jean-Pol Poncelet, regretted
that the Presidency had been obliged to limit its
ambitions because certain countnes did not want
greater involvement of WEU.
274. On 2l November 1996, the Insh
Presidency, representrng the European Union,
declared that the Unron was seriously concerned
by the srtuation in southern Kivu (in Eastern
Zaire). It asked all the parties involved to shorv
modcratron and do what was necessary to
prevent an open conflict spilling over the border
into Rwanda.
275. It said that rt was morutonng the situation
closely and that its special envoy in the Great
Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, had met with the
authorities of both Zatre and Rwanda. The
Union supported the efforts being made by the
United Nations to promote a peaceful settlement
of the situation. Finally, it was strongly con-
vinced that the problems outstanding could only
be solved through dialogue.
276. That same day, the European Commission
declared that the European Union needed to
become more rnvolved by provrding emergency
ard and should take action to relaunch the
political dialogue.
277. The European Union again insisted that
the crisis had to be solved by peaceful means. It
promrqed all its support for an early dialogue
between the authorities of Zaire and Rwanda and
endorsed the efforts of the United Nations. the
Orgarusation for African Unity and regional
leaders to achieve a peaceful settlement of the
cnsis in southern Kilu.
278. The European Union thought the cnsis in
southern Kilu demonstrated how urgent it was to
deal effectively with the huge problems posed by
the presence of over a million refugees and
displaced persons in the Great Lakes region. It
considered a strategy for solving the refugee
problem was a key element in the search for a
global and lastrng solution to the problems of the
region as a whole
279. The Union reaffirmed that in rts view a
regional conference on peace, securitl'and stabi-
lrty rn the Great Lakes region 
- 
held under the
auspices of the United Natrons and the Org-
amsation for African Unity 
- 
had a crucial role
to play in findrng such a solution. It called upon
all the parties to redouble their efforts so that
such a conference could be held
280. Later, on 22 November 1996, the Devel-
opment Council of the European Union adopted a
decision in whrch it requested WEU to urgentll'
examine how rt might contribute to making the
best use of the available operational assets that
concerned rt, m order to assist with the re-
patriation of refugees in the Great Lakes region.
The Councrl noted that as the joint action it had
already adopted for the region had defence
implications and might, among other things,
require the use of mrhtar)' means. it was approp-
riate to have recourse to WEU. The latter's
reactron to this request is descnbed in paragraph
295 ofthe present report.
281. At a meetrng in Stuttgart on 22-24 Nov-
ember 1996, in which more than 30 Western and
Afrrcan states and relief agencies participated,
military representatives agrecd on a number of
dif[erent optlons for mtervention m the Great
Lakes region. These options ranged from the
zero option of not sending any troops, to the
establishment of a large military force with
headquarters in the region, capable of mounting a
relief operation with self-supporting logistics
back-up.
282. At the meetmg, the number of known
refugees was estimated at 250 000 while there
were perhaps 300 000 more whose presence had
not ),et been confirmed by aerial reconnaissance.
The different options for military action were
forwarded to governments for an urgent decision
on r,r'hat course of action should be taken.
283. After this meeting, the Canadran General
Maurice Baril, designated commander of the
multinational force, indicated that it would have
to be purely humanitarian and politically and
militarily neutral. Its sze would depend on the




284 On 29 November 1996. an agreement was
finally concluded between l4 countnes to launch
a militarl' humanitanan missron m order to pro-
vide relief for refugees.
285 It should be noted that on 25 November
1996, the Government of Rrvanda announced
that it rvould not authonse a multinational force
to enter its territorl'. That same day, the Euro-
pean Union's Council of Ministers for Forergn
Affairs met rvith rts special envoy, Aldo Ajello,
for an update on the situatron. The Ministers
thought that the drspatch of an intemational force
in order to provide assistance for the refugees
was strll needed. France and Spain recalled that
they were ready to participate in such a force,
but the United Kingdom's Minister for Foreign
Affairs declared that it was diffrcult to take a
decision u'ithout having a global view of the
situation.
286 Noting that in the United Nations Security
Council, discussions on the implementatron of
Resolution 1080 were contrnurng, the Council
recalled the European Union's contribution to the
United Nations's effort to solvc the cnsis in the
reglon and its decrsion to ask WEU to elaborate
and rmplement certain aspects of this common
action
287. Commissioner Bonrno on 26 November
1996 again called for emergency military inter-
vention by the internatronal communit.v in order
to provide assistance to the refugees in Eastern
Zatre. On 6 December, the Belgian Foreign Min-
ister criticised the Canadian Govemment which,
through rts Defence Minister. Douglas Young,
had declared that an intervention force had
become useless. He also regretted the "slou'-
ness" of procedures within WEU where nothrng
had happened srnce Ostend when it had declared
rts readmess to participate in a humanitanan
operation.
288. At its Dublin summit meeting on 13 and
14 December 1996, the European Councrl
rerterated the need for action. Among other
thmgs, it declared that the situation vvas still
critical in humanitarian terms, partrcularly in
Eastern Zaire, and required the international
community to act srviftly and decisively. Stress-
ing the need for flexibility in view of the rapidly
changrng situation on the ground, the European
Councrl considered that it was necessary to
quickly assess the implicatrons of the latest
developments for the implementation of the
Unrted Nations Security Council resolutions
concerning the establishment, for humanitarran
purposes, of a temporary multinational force In
this connection, the European Councrl reaffirmed
the European Umon's resolve to contribute fuII1,
and as a matter of urgency' to the efforts in ques-
tion. m accordance with the joint action taken on
22 November 1996, the assocrated Council
decision adopted on that date and the WEU min-
isterial declaration of l9 November It rvelcomed
the Commission's proposal for a comprehensive
strategic plan of action concerning EU aid for the
Great Lakes region.
289 The Council welcomed the initiative of the
heads of state of the regron to solve the problems
of Eastern Zaire by dialogue and emphasised the
vital importance of respect for the terntorial
integritv and the sovereignty of Zatre and the
search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.
290. On23 December 1996, the United Natrons
Securrty Councrl formally termrnated the multi-
national force under Canadian command which
had never been deployed. Only a ferv hundred
troops of this force. based on Security Councrl
Resolution 1080 of l6 November 1996, had been
deplol'ed in Uganda. Canada had already de-
clared on 13 December that there rvas no longer
any ratson d'Atre for it.
XI. WEU and the crisis in Zaire
291. At the same time WEU, on its own
inrtrative, started consrdering its involvement in
the operatrons being prepared in the framework
of the United Nations On 15 November, the
WEU Permanent Councrl asked the Planning Cell
to examine options for possrble WEU involve-
ment in the Great Lakes region.
292. The Planning Cell, whrch had been
following developments for some time alreadl',
was able to react very quickly and the next day,
16 November, it formally presented its advice on
four possrble options as follows:
I the coordmation of transport for the
multinational force being prepared under
Canadran command where, in the opinion
of the Plannrng Cell, WEU could not make
a useful contribution;
2. the coordination of transport for the
humarutanan aid operation berng prepared
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by the European Union, which was con-
idered to be wholly feasible,
3 the coordinatron of training for militar-r'
units which African countries mrght
provide for the multrnational force. The
Planning Cell considered it too late to train
the first unrts, but training could be pro-
vided for units being prepared for rotatron,
4. possible wider support and logistics for
the multinational force and the human-
itarian operation. According to the
Planning Cell, WEU could not provide
added value for the multinational force but
it could play a useful wider role for the
humanitarian operation.
293. The Permanent Council immediately
agreed to the advice of the Planning Cell, which
was presented to the Ministerial Councrl. At rts
meeting in Ostend on 19 November, the Council
took account of the advrce of the Planning Cell,
as rs evident in paragraph 3 of the "Mintsterial
declaration on the srtuation in the Great Lakes
region", quoted in paragraphs 265-271 of the
present report.
294. On22 November, the Development Coun-
cil of the European Union, in application of
Article J 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union,
requested WEU to examine ways m which it
might contribute to making the best use of the
available operatronal assets in order 
_to assist
wrth the repatriation of refugees in the Great
Lakes region.
295 This request resulted in the Plannrng Cell
giving advrce to the WEU Permanent Council on
2 December, including more specific answers as
regards the possrbilities of performing a number
of tasks. In particular, the Planning Cell replied
that it was feasible for WEU to be involved in the
provision of transport aircraft for the civil
humanitarian operation and in the delivery of
humanitarian ard with military transport. The
Plaruring Cell further confirmed the feasibility of
assistance in the field of training to be given to
milrtary units from Afncan nations which might
in due course be deployed in the region.
296. Meanwhile, a Planning Cell staff offtcer
had helped to plan a meeting for the
multinational force which took place rn Stuttgart
on 22-24 November, while later on a Planning
Cell offrcer was deployed in Kampala, where
units for the multrnational force had started to
assemble.
297. On 6 December, the WEU Permanent
Council accepted the advrce of the Planning Cell
and reported to the European Unron.
298. In WEU, the Presidency made every effort
to obtain agreement on the active involvement of
milrtary resources in the area of operatrons but in
the end consensus could only be reached on a
role for the Planning Cell to coordmate offers
coming from the various WEU countries. Drsap-
pointed by thrs minrmalist attitude, those who
had been arguing for more active WEU tnvolve-
ment decrded no action at all was better than
minimalist action and the rdea of actrve WEU
involvement was eventually abandoned com-
pletely.
299. From the beginning of the crists, all the
relevant organs of WEU including the Planning
Cell, the Satellrte Centre, the Situation Centre
and the Intelligence Section, have been momtor-
ing developments on the instructions of the
Permanent Councrl.
XII. The UN-OAU peace plan
300. At the end of January 1997, the new
Secretary-General of the United Natrons, Kofi
Annan, nommated Mohamed Sahnoun to be the
lornt special representative of the United Nations
and the Organisation for African unity for the
Great Lakes region. According to his mandate,
Mr Sahnoun was charged u'ith findrng a peaceful
solution to the different conflicts of the region,
with preparing an international conference and
preserving the unity and terntorral integrity of
Zaire.
301. In an interview grven after his appoint-
ment, Mr Sahnoun declared that there was no
need to draft a mini-Marshall Plan for the whole
region, integrating humanitarian, economic and
social aspects. As regards the rampant illegal
arms trade in the region, he was hoping that the
great powers would show exemplary conduct.
They should also reduce their intervention and
make sure they exerted a positive influence in the
reglon.
302. After many consultations with the parties
involved in the crisis, other Afrrcan states, the
European Union and its member states and the
United States, Mr Sahnoun drafted a peace plan.
4l
DOCUMENT 1566
303 On l8 February 1997, the Umted States
Securitl' Council unarumously adopted Res-
olutron 1097, includrng the five basrc elements of
this peace plan:
an rmmediate ceasefire;
u'ithdrarval of all foreign forces, includ-
ing mercenanes;
confirmation of the respect for the
national sovereign and territorial integ-
rity, of Zaire and the other states of the
Great Lakes region:
protectron of all refugees and drsplaced
persons and easy access for human-
itarian action;
- 
raprd and peaceful settlement of the
crisis through dialogue, elections and
the convenmg of an internatronal conf-
erence on peace, security and develop-
ment rn the Great Lakes region.
XilI. *VEU operations and the
United Nations Charter
304. The Petersberg Declaratron of 19 June
1992, rvhich is strll a basic document for WEU's
activities, states that:
"Decisions to use milrtary units answer-
able to WEU rvill be taken by the WEU
Council in accordance rvith the provisions
of the United Natrons Charter".
305. Obviously, WEU will alwal's take care to
ensure that its operatrons, rvhether in application
of Article V or Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty, are legitrmate and in accordance
rvith the rules of international lau'r2.
306. Operations on the basis of Artrcle V are
covered b1' Artrcle 5l of the UN Charter, which
among other things stipulates that:
"Nothrng in the present Charter shall
impair the rnherent right of indivrdual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the Umted
" Refence is made here to The role of the l4/estern
European Union ftVELt) rn the marntenance of
mternational peace and securitv, b1' Luisa Vierucci
in Internatronal peacekeeptng, Yolrtme 2, No. 3,
Autumn 1995
Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace illd secunty,"
307. The legal basrs for WEU out-of-area
operatrons can be found in Article VIII, para-
graph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty which
states
"At the request of any of the High
Contracting Parties the Council shall be
immediately convened in order to permit
them to consult wrth regard to any
situation which mav constitute a threat to
peace, in whatever area this threat should
anse, or a danger to economic stabilrty".
308. Furthermore, it should be noted that
WEU's Rome Declaratron of 1984, The Hague
Platform on European Security Interests of 1987
and the document "European securitv a common
concept of the 27 WEU countries" refer to
possrble WEU out-of-area operations.
309. In the Rome Declaration, ministers decided
'to hold comprehensive drscussrons and to seek
to harmonise therr views on the specrfic con-
ditions of secunty m Europe", but thel' added
that they might "also consider the implications
for Europe of cnses in other regions of the
r,l'orld".
310 In The Hague Platform, ministers of the
WEU member states emphasised that they would
"concert (their) policies on crises outside Europe
in so far as they may affect our securitl' inter-
ests".
311. The document "European secunty a com-
mon concept of the 27 WEU countnes", adopted
rn Madrrd in November 1995, identified comrnon
rnterests, risks and potential threats, and also
"Europe's new responsibrlrties in a new strategic
environment in which Europe's securitv is not
confined to secuntv m Europe, and in which
Europe has acquired the capability to make its
own contributron to the buildrng of a lust and
peaceful rvorld ordcr".
312. In the same document, it rvas further stated
that "As the defence component of the European
Union and as a means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alhance, WEU is in a
position to respond to many of the challenges
identrfied in the politrco-milrtary, field".
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313. The Madrid document of 1995 also
mentions the relatronship between WEU and the
United Natrons declaring:
"The Unrted Nations is the global
institutron responsible for the maintenance
of internatronal peace and secunty As
WEU continues to develop its operational
capabilities, it wrll support, on a case-by-
case basrs and in accordance with its orvn
procedures, conflict prevention and crisis
management measurcs under UN aegis.
WEU should now envisage what expertise,
or logrstic and personnel contnbutions
could be made available for UN activitres
in this field".
314. WEU's first consultations in the
framework of Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the
modrfied Brussels Treaty were held in Aprrl
1988, when free navrgatron in the Gulf region
was restncted as a consequence of the lran-Iraq
war. This led to WEU's mine-clearance Oper-
ation Cleansweep in August 1988, in order to
guarantee free navigation m the waters of the
Gulf region while supporting UN Securitl' Coun-
crl Resolution 589 of 20 July 1987.
315. Although there was no formal link, WEU
had declared rts support for Security Council
Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987.
316. On 21 August 1990, some weeks after the
mvasion of Iraq by Kuwart, WEU ministers lent
their support to Security Councrl Resolutron 661
(6 August 1990) on an economic and military
embargo. In Operation Desert Storm, WEU
countries limited themselves solel,v to ensuring
the supply of munitions, spare parts and equrp-
ment to the United Kingdom and French forces in
Saudi Arabra. A permanent WEU coordination
authorrty was appointed
317. WEU's Operation Sharp Vigilance in the
Adriatic Sea rvas launched on 16 July 1992 with
a twofold purpose:
- 
to ensure the implementation of the
embargo on deliveries of weapons and
military equipment to Yugoslavia de-
creed in UN Security Councrl Res-
olution 713 of 25 September l99l;
to monitor the rmplementation of the
economrc sanctions on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia m compliance
urth UN Security Councrl Resolution
757 of 30 Ma1' 1992.
318. At this earll' stage, WEU's activity' was
limitcd to identificatlon vla radro of the natron-
ality of ships, their port of departure, destinatron
and cargoes. The measures envisaged in Res-
olutrons 713 and 757, based on Chapter VII of
the LIN Charter and the Securitv Council
decision. were addressed to "all states" without
reference to therr possrble implementation by
way of regional agencres.
319. When tightening the sanctions, in
particular in Resolution 787 (16 November
1992), the Security Councrl called upon "states
acting nationally or through regional agencies or
arrangements" to hclp ensure the implementation
of the provisrons of Resolutions 713 and 757.
The ships participating in WEU's Operatron
Sharp Vigrlance were norv allowed to include
"stop and search actions and other mcasures as
r0cessar1,".
320. As regards the implementation of
sanctrons on the river Danube, the Security
Council, in Resolution 820, addressed itself to
"all states, including non-nparian states, to pro-
vide, acting nationally or through regronal org-
anisations or arrangements, such assistance as
may be required ..".
321. According to the Securitl' Councrl,
Resolutions 787 and 820 requrring the
enforcement of sanctions decreed rn Resoluttons
713 and 757 
- 
are covered by Chapters VII and
VIII of the [N Charter although it does not refer
to any particular provrslon
322 The rvording of the abovementioned
Resolutions vaguell' recalls the text of Article 4l
in Chapter VII, in which it rs said that "the
Security Council may call upon the members of
the United Nations to apply such measures".
323. It should be noted, however, that Article
4l refers to measures "not involving the use of
armed force".
324. Article 42 is the legitrmrsrng basis for an1,
"action by air, sea or land forces as ma1, be
necessar)' to maintam or restore mternattonal
peace and security" This article also stipulates
that "such actron may mclude demonstrations,
blockades, and other operations by air, sea or
land forces of members of the United Nations".
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325. Obviousll', the Secunty Council can only
invite states to make a voluntary contributron to
the rmplementatron of the measures it has
decrded. A derogation from basic prrnciples of
international larv is clearly only possible rf the
Securitl' Councrl determines that a threat to, or
breach of, the peace or an act of aggression
require actrons departing from those prrnciples
Such measures of derogation arc legitrmate only
where thel' are necessary to maintain or restore
peace in the area
326. Before taking decisrons in application of
Articles 41 and 42, the Security Council has to
appl1, Article 39 in order to deterrnme whether
"any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression" exrsts.
327. For thc legrtimacy of WEU out-of-area
operatrons, it is important to determine rvhether
WEU rs a regional organisation as referred to in
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 53 of
the Charter rs the only Artrcle rvhich contams an
explicit delegation of porver from the Security
Council to a decentralised authority
328. Article 52 of the Charter recognises "the
exrstence of regional arrangements or agencles
for dealing vvith such matters relating to the
maintenance of intematronal peace and securitv
as are appropriate for regronal actron" on the
conditron "that such arrangements or agencies
and therr activities are consistent with the pur-
poses and prrnciples of the Unrted Nations".
329. Although there exists no authoritative
explanation of Article 52, it is often assumed that
the reference to "matters appropriate for regional
actions" only allows for operations by such org-
anrsations within the borders of the ternton,
covered by their member states.
330. On the other hand, Article 53 stipulates
that: "The Secunty Council shall, where approp-
riate, utrhse such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement actron under its auth-
orrty". It should be noted that use of the words
"where appropriate" in this artrcle allows for a
flexible interpretation which naturally depends on
politrcal agreement among the I-IN member
states.
331. All in all, one might conclude that Artrcle
42 in Chapter MI of the Charter is an even more
flexrble legal basis for coercive action because rt
allows for actron "by air, sea or land forces of
members of the United Nations" wrthout spec-
if,ring whether such forces act rn the framework
of an ad hoc coalition or of a regronal org-
anisation.
332 Fmallv, it should be noted that according
to paragraph I of Artrcle 48 in Chapter VII:
"The action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of intemational peace and
security shall be taken by all the members
of the Unrted Nations or by some of them,
as the Security Councrl may determine."
and that paragraph 2 of Article 48 stipulates
that
"Such decisions shall be carried out by the
members of the United Nations drrectly
and through their action in the appropriate
international agencres of whrch they are
members."
333. The conclusion can only be that, if need
be, the UN Charter offers sufficient scope to
provrde a legal basis for WEU out-of-area oper-
ations




334 The obvious question which comes to
mmd is whether conflict prevention, human
interventron, peacekeeprng and even peacemaking
operations are any use if 
- 
as has often been the
case 
- 
thev merel1, replace one governing clan by
another rvithout much change in polrtical and
admrnistratrve habits
335. It should be emphasised that, rn the first
place, it is the responsibilrty of African govern-
ments to ensure the peaceful, sccure and pros-
perous future of their countries As long as
political and financral-economic elites do not feel
more responsrble for the socio-economic develop-
ment of their entire society, there is no place for
Africa rn the developrng world.
336. Any foreign interventron or assistance in
crisis situations will come to nothing and would
only lead to the further neglect and abandonment
of sub-Saharan Africa in particular if no addr-
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tional efforts are made to establish or remforce
democracy and carry through economic reform.
A number of reports on the economrc outlook for
Afrrca, which have recently been published,
corroborate this view.
337 In a recent report on the implications of
the globahsation of industry for developing
countries, the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organisation made a critical appraisal of
the general economic situation in Africar3.
338. The report recognises that Africa has
excellent potential for mvestment and growth in
agriculture, mining, tourism and the agro-
industry It adds, however, that formidable chal-
lenges strll have to be overcome, such as poor
management, inadequate levels of savings, a
weak infrastructure, shortages of skills, low pro-
ductivrty, high transport costs and strong com-
petition from other developing regions Progress
must be made on several fronts simultaneously.
Policy makers in Africa, says the report, "must
tackle trade, fiscal pohcy, law and order, trans-
parency and accountability, rnfrastructure, hum-
an resource development, privatisation, agricul-
tural development and industrial strategy".
339. Because of the abovementioned serious
shortcomings, in the first half of the 1990s sub-
Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa)
attracted only US$ 3.7 billion of direct foreign
investment, little more than 3oh of the total direct
foreign investment flow to all developing coun-
tries.
340. Sub-Saharan Africa's share in global
manufacturing fell from 0.60/o in 1970 to 0.3% in
1995. Its share ofglobal exports fell from 3.1%
in the mid-1950s to 1.2%o in 1990 While the
African region must invest I3%;o of its GDP to
maintain its existing capital stock, net investment
in the first half of the 1990s was barely positive
at3.5%o of GDP.
341. A World Bank report'o argues that dev-
eloping countries since 1970 have achieved a
modest I 5% growth in GNP per head on
average, but that sub-Saharan Afnca has seen its
GNP per head diminish 0.8% a year in real terms
" The globahsatrcn of industry: rmplications for
developmg counlnes beyond 2000,Unido, Viennat4 World Development Indrcators 1997
srnce 1970. In Zaire, real GNP per head has
fallen 4o/o ln a )rear.
342 The globalisation of markets makes it even
harder for lagging economies not to be margm-
alised. Afncan governments u'illing to adapt and
reform their economies do not have much room
for experiments in therr monetar,' and exchange
rate policies in present-day capital markets.
Marginalisation from the global market will re-
sult in increasing poverty and socral and ethnic
tensions.
343. On 5 February 1997, the OECD published
the 1995 statrstics on development aid from the
2l members of rts Development Ard Committee
(DAC). The total of US$ 59 billion spent on
development aid by these rich countries in 1995,
which represents an average 0.27% of their
GNP, was 9% less than the amount spent in
1994
344. The United States, with 0.lo/o of its GNP,
is by far the lowest spender. While some ten
years ago, its development aid was still almost
250/o of total DAC aid, in 1995 this had been
reduced to 12.5o/r. As a result of the many
regional conflicts and civil wars in developing
countries, an increasingly larger part of develop-
ment aid is spent on urgent humanitarian ard to
the detnment of long-term prograrnmes.
345. The OECD report therefore emphasises
the need for conflrct prevention through more
rapid and more decisive mtervention by the inter-
national commuruty. It also notes that since
1990, almost 40o/o of DAC aid is spent in Africa.
346. These are appalling figures and civil u'ars,
genocide and corrupt and totalitanan regimes
such as that of Mobutu and his ignominrous clan
in Zaire have cer[ainly not made a positive
contribution to turn the tide.
347. There is an urgent need for a new
development strategy for sub-Saharan Africa
which takes account of the lessons learnt from
past farlures. Sub-Saharan Africa will not be
able to survrve without foreign aid and asslstance
but the goverrments of these countries cannot
shrink their responsibilities either. They will
have to decide on and consistently implement
over many years the economic and political




XV The needfor o common European
foreign and security policy on Africa
348. One of the declared oblectrves of the
Maastrrcht Treaty on European Union was "to
confirm [Europe's] identity on the intematronal
scene, rn partrcular by the cstablishment of a
common foreign and secunty policy"' The
Treaty' rncluded elaborate texts. Artrcles wcre
specifically desrgned to help implement this ob-
lective. Therc are enough understandable
reasons u'hv this ambrtious goal could not be
attained overmght. The handhng of the Yugoslav
crisis rs the best example of the embarrassing
shortcomings of the old EC foreign policy
349. Indecd, that cnsrs erupted when negotia-
tions on the Treaty' were in their final stages and
the European Union should not be blamed for the
lack of a policy u'hrch rvas obviously still ir
statu nascendr. Since then, more than five 1,ears
have passed and despite manl' solemn dec-
larations, the situatron hardly seems to have
improved, as can be seen from the hesitant re-
actions of the EU and the divrded reactions of its
member states rn recent crises.
350. Of course, the European Union made
statements in rvhich rt expressed its grave con-
cern and in which it insisted on the importance of
finding a peaceful solution by polrtrcal means. It
even nominated a special representative for the
Great Lakes region u'ho shuttled to and fro
betrveen the various parties mvolved in the con-
flrct and Brussels, keeping the European Councrl
abreast of developments. Horvever, desprte all
the efforts of the specral representative and the
repeated appeals of the European Commissroner
for humanitarian aid, no energetic decision-
making rvas forthcoming.
351. The common foreign and security pohcy
has never been more than the lowest corilnon
denominator of widely divergent opinions of the
EU member states. At the EU level, no suc-
cessful attempt has yet been made to anall'se the
common interests of the member states in order
to agree on the policy which should be imple-
mented for the protectron of such interests
352. On the other hand, the EU member states
have no lack ofdeep background knowledge and
up-to-date intelligence on developments in those
areas of the world where their rnterests are at
stake. In the recent past, European rntellectual
and political input has been used by others to
achieve a drplomatrc success on the world stage
Often, Europe is the main contributor rvhen rt
comes to financial fundrng for economic and
humarutarian ard or investments.
353. A recent Franco-German document in pre-
paration for the conclusion of the mtergov-
ernmental conference rightly' emphasised the need
for a joint analysis of Europe's common interests
in the rvorld. It called for the establishment of an
analysis cell rvhich should facrlitate convergence
on matters of vital and strategic common interest
to the member states. Thrs cell should include
representatives of the member states, but also of
the European Commission and WEU.
354. In order to ensure the rmplementation of
priority action rn the field of the common foreign
and securi[, policy, France and Germany have
proposed the nomination of a topJevel polrtician
by, the governments of the member states. This
"Secretary-General" or "hrgh representative"
would be answerable to the Council of Foreign
Affairs Ministers and rvould be given a specific
mandate. At the time of writing this report, there
are rumours that at least part of the Franco-
German proposal will be agreed to at the Euro-
pean Council summrt meeting rn Amsterdam in
June. Thrs would be an important step torvards
laying the foundatrons for a coherent and com-
mon European secunty and defence policy.
355 It should be noted that at an earlier stage,
the WEU Council of Minrsters had already. made
a senous effort to define the basic elements for a
European secunty pohcy when it adopted the
document "European security: a corrrmon con-
cept of the 27 WEU countnes" at its November
1995 Madrid meeting. In that document, Africa
was called dn area of interest for Europe and rt
was argued that:
"Africa's serious economic problems
deserve due political attention. A further
deterioration of the social, economic and
political situation on the African continent
would aggravate the risk of permanent
instabilrty and increase migratory pressure
from the Africans. Further rnstability is
generated by a lack of adherence to dem-
ocratic principles, wrdespread, unchecked




The document further noted that:
"Armed conflict on the Afrrcan continent
is now predomrnantly intra-state in char-
acter The international community has
been faced with the implosion of states and
the major humanitarian tragedies whrch
ensue "
356. Indeed, the most frequent risks and threats
to peace can be specified as follows:
- 
the rc-emergence of armed banditry,
further encouraged by the wide prolif-
eration of clashes betrveen governments
in power and oppositron parties be-
cause of firearms among the civilian
populatron;
politrcal of resrstance to democrat-
isation and a refusal to respect the rules
of democracy;
mutiny rn sectrons of the armed forces
arising from socio-economic claims
rvhich frequently, develop rnto polrtical
demands;
interstate conflicts and tensions as a
result of changes in states' policies and
attitudes torvards their neighbours;
autocratic and dictatorial regimes
which not only block powersharing and
democratic reform, but which also
reject any economic reform enabling a
larger part of the population to have
their share in the country's economic
output.
357. Should Europe help Africa? Whenever
this question is asked, too many people shrug
their shoulders suggestrng that Africa should be
left to its own devices. This seems an easy
solution but the present situation does not count-
enance indifference. Europe, as a result of its
long-standrng relatrons with Africa, has accum-
ulated extensrve knowledge of that part of the
world and has a responsibility for the contment
from which it cannot shy away.
358. Although the OAU and other sub-regional
organisations are trying to develop therr own
mecharusms for crisis preventlon and manage-
ment, they are not y,et able to cope with the many
different cnses effectively, not least because such
organisations often lack the necessary funds to
estabhsh structures of the appropriate size
Likewrse, the concept of African peacekeeprng
units or raprd rntervention forces is only in its
infancy, one possrble problem being their impar-
tiality, as was experienced rvrth the ECOWAS
force in Liberra.
359. While it may be true that no vital security
interests are at stake for Europe, there are still
other valid reasons for developing a common pol-
rcy on conflict prevention and resolution in
Africars. Accordrng to the EU, respect for
human rrghts and democracy and the rule of law
and good govemance are the essential elements
of the preferential relationshrp between the EU
and former European colonies as established by
the Lom6 Agreements.
360. Europe cannot therefore remain indrfferent
to humanitanan disasters without losing rts cred-
ibility. Tensions and conflicts in sub-Saharan
Afrrca do not only directly threaten European
citrzens hving rn those areas but can also have
contagious effects on nerghbounng countries.
The crisis and genocrde in Rwanda have trig-
gered the rebellion in Zaire. Europe has an
economic interest in sub-Saharan Africa. At
present, EU trade with this part of the vvorld is
not very significant but Africa's extensive nat-
ural resources, rts grorving population and its
favourable geographical situation may transform
it into an important trade partner in the future.
Meanwhrle, rt should be noted that through the
Lom6 Agreements, Europe rs the region's main
trade and cooperatron partner and the major
donor of aid to sub-Saharan Afrrca. In order to
help Africa develop its economy, Europe must
actively, stimulate and support democratic and
economlc reform.
361 There are also other important reasons
why Europe's pohcy towards Africa should be
the result of a common approach. In the case of
any military operations, lomt actron through
WEU will be more easrlv acceptable than an
operation by a single state which can easily be
accused of pursuing rts own mterests. A com-
mon approach will ideally also combine the
advantages ofprofound knowledge ofthe regron
of former colonial powers and the more open-
15 See Alvaro Vasconcelos: Should Europe have a
policy on Africa? in trI'EU's role in cnsts
management and conJhct resoluhon m sub-Saharan




minded judgment of those countries which have
not had a colonial history in Africa.
362. In the Madrid document on "European
secunty': a corrmon concept of the 27 WEU
countries", rt was stated that.
"European countries are currently exam-
ining, brlaterally and in the frameworks of
the lIN, the EU and WEU, possibilities to
support Africa's own efforts, includurg
through regional and sub-regional insti-
tutions and structures, to promote the pre-
servation of peace, the search for recon-
ciliation and the achievement of sustain-
able and socially balanced development
through good governance."
363. European reactions to the crisis in Zaire
have demonstrated that much remains to be done
before Europe is able to react swiftly and ade-
quately to crises in the world wherever its inter-
ests are involved.
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